Nova Law Review
Volume 24, Issue 1

1999

Article 11

Trial De Novo and Evidentiary Presumptions
Under the “Lemon Law”: Analysis and
Comment
Larry M. Roth∗

∗

Copyright c 1999 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr

Roth: Trial De Novo and Evidentiary Presumptions Under the "Lemon Law":

Trial De Novo and Evidentiary Presumptions Under the
"Lemon Law": Analysis and Comment
Larry M. Roth**

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................
II. LEMON LAW LEGISLATION ............................................................
A. What is the Lemon Law? ........................................................
B. The Lemon Law ArbitrationBoard........................................
C. Legislative History of Section 681 .........................................
D. Other States and Other Laws .................................................
ITI. CASE DECISION ANALYSIS ON TRIAL DE NOVO ...........................
A. FromMason I Through Pitsirelos.........................................
B. Mason I and PitsirelosWere Wrongly Decided ....................
1. Mason Is Improper Reliance on Zoning Laws ................
2. Mason /s Inappropriate Reliance on Ad Valorem
Tax Statutes .......................................................................
3. Mason I Misinterpreted Case Law Precedent ...................
C. What a Trial De Novo Should Be ...........................................
D. How Section 681 Intended A TraditionalTrialDe
Novo Proceeding....................................................................
IV. THE EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF A LEMON LAW ARBITRATION
BOARD DECISION .........................................................................
A. Backgroundof Evidentiary Presumptions.............................
B. The PitsirelosRuling on PresumptionsDidNot
Clarify the Issue.....................................................................
V. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ROLE INTHE LEMON LAW
ADMINISTRATION .........................................................................
VI. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS AND ACTIONS .....................................

409
411
411
413
415
417
422
422
426
428
433
435
441
447
450
451
453
454
461

A much shorter and less comprehensive version of this Article was published in
*
the Fall 1998 issue of TrialAdvocateQuarterly,Volume 17, Number 4, at 36.
**
B.S., University of Tennessee, 1973; J.D., University of Florida, 1975. The

Author wishes to thank Christi L. Underwood of Foley & Lardner (Orlando office) for her
assistance in reviewing and commenting on this Article.
Author's Note: This article reflects the personal opinions of the author, developed
mostly as a result of particular litigation experiences. The views set forth below are not
intended to represent or to reflect the opinions of any other person, or any motor vehicle
manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or client.

Published by NSUWorks, 1999

1

Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 11

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 24:407

A . Legislative ..............................................................................
B . Judicial...................................................................................
V II. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................

462
464
467

To consumers, car dealers, wholesale distributors, and manufacturers of
motor vehicles, Florida's statutory framework known as the Motor Vehicle
Warranty Enforcement Act ("section 681")1 has become an important factor
of economic and commercial life.2 In common parlance, this statute is
known as the Lemon Law. 3 The "Lemon" reference pertains to a motor
vehicle. The Lemon Law has also become important to lawyers, as it has
spawned a new and different type of litigation and legal counseling. As the
number of new motor vehicles sold in Florida increases with population
growth, so too does the financial risk exposure arising from Lemon Law
claims. This results in an increasing number of consumers who are unhappy
with their new vehicles.
To date, the judicial analysis of the Lemon Law has been unsettled,
confusing, and even contradictory.4 In September 1998, the Supreme Court
of Florida had the opportunity to establish an understandable and realistic
construction of the Lemon Law. Yet, the court in Chrysler Corp. v.
Pitsirelos6 missed that opportunity. 7 For example, when confronted with the
trial de novo language of section 681,8 the court followed the Fifth District's
decision in Mason v. Porsche Cars of North America, Inc.,9 a case which this
article will demonstrate was wrongly decided. 10 As such, in relying on
Mason I, the Supreme Court of Florida also reached the wrong result.

1.
FLA. STAT. §§ 681.10-.118 (1999). This article discusses several cases that have
arisen under the 1988-1993 versions of that statute. The present statute has not changed in
substance on the issues discussed herein. Only the numbering scheme has been revised. Unless
otherwise noted, all references are to the 1999 statutes.
2.
Automobile dealers have historically been specifically excluded under the Lemon
Law. They are deemed to be the manufacturer's agent under that law. See FLA. STAT. § 681.102
(1991). Only recently has section 681.102(1) of the Florida Statutes been amended to include a
"franchised motor vehicle dealer." Id. § 681.102 (1999). A dealer's liability under the Lemon
Law is precluded, although there are some remedies available to a manufacturer. Id.§ 681.113
(1999). This is not an issue for discussion in this article.
3.
Id. § 681.102 (1999).
4.
See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1998).
Id. at 710.
5.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Id. at 713-15.
9.
621 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) [hereinafter "Mason 1].
10. Id.
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I. INTRODUCION

The genesis for this article derived from trial and litigation experiences
in a particular Lemon Law case, the Mason I litigation referred to above."1
The intent here is to analyze the procedural and evidentiary inconsistencies
that have been judicially read into the Lemon Law, and to ultimately
recommend not only legislative or political changes, but also a different
judicial approach from that which the appellate courts have followed to date.
This article will therefore critique the current law, both statutory and
judicial, as to what a trial de novo is under section 681.1095(12) of the
Florida Statutes, and the evidentiary weight to be given a "decision" of a
Lemon Law arbitration board in a subsequent judicial proceeding. 2
Essentially, Lemon Law arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution
proceeding. It is informal and intended to be inexpensive and expeditious.
The statute does, however, permit a trial de novo in the circuit court
13
subsequent to these informal proceedings.
On this issue, precedent was
first established by Mason I in 1993, where the court held that a trial de novo
under the statute is really an "appeal" to the circuit court after an arbitration
award."4 That decision, interpreting the Lemon Law statute, was arguably a

consumer interest driven result, and not a strict judicial interpretation of
11. Id. See also Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 688 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (setting aside the attorneys' fee award for Porsche) [hereinafter "Mason IF'].
Mason I has already had impact beyond section 681 circumstances. In Kahn v. Villas at Eagle
Point Condominium Ass'n, the Second District used Mason I to interpret a different statutory
scheme, section 718.1255(4)(c) of the FloridaStatutes. 693 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1997). The statute involved did not discuss an appeal from the arbitration, but whether a

"'complaint' for trial de novo" could be filed in circuit court. Id. at 1030. Kahn involved a
dispute over a deck addition to a condominium unit. Id. The dispute, by statute, was handled in
a non-binding arbitration proceeding. Id. Unlike section 681, these arbitration proceedings are
presided over by the Department of Professional Regulations which employs "ful-time attorneys
to act as arbitrators." FA.STAT. § 718.1255(4) (1995). In Kahn, there was a two-page opinion
requiring the owners to remove their deck. Kahn, 693 So. 2d at 1030. Kahn claimed that the
condo owner had the burden of persuasion to "demonstrate some error in the administrative
decision." Id. The court, however, did not determine burden of proof, so that there was no ruling
on the presumptive validity of the administrative decision. Id. The property owners lost at the
administrative level and then again at the bench trial. Id. The trial judge did not review the
administrative order, which the Second District thought inappropriate. Id. Section 718.1255(4),
unlike section 681, requires that arbitrators have specialized background in that case, being
members of the Florida Bar. § 718.1255(4).
12. The formal name of the statute is Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act. §
681.10(1999).
13. § 681.1095(12).
14. Mason 1,621 So. 2d at 722-23.

Published by NSUWorks, 1999

3

Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 11

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 24:407

legislative intent. In Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos,15 the Supreme Court of
Florida adopted the Mason I conclusion, without critique or its own
analysis. 16 Yet, there are patent errors in the case law analysis of Mason I
which should have been discerned by the Supreme Court of Florida, and not
otherwise made the law of Florida in Pitsirelos. As the law now stands, a
manufacturer who loses at the arbitration level and requests a trial de novo
must show up on the courthouse steps as a plaintiff, with the burden of
persuasion to disprove that the vehicle is not a "Lemon."' 17 As such, this is
not a trial de novo and is not what the statute intended.
The second major point of the article discusses whether a written
Lemon Law arbitration "decision" should have any evidentiary presumption
of correctness in the subsequent de novo judicial proceeding. The Pitsirelos
court held that it should not, overturning several lower court decisions,
including the Mason II appeal decided by the Fifth District.
Yet, this
particular result by the Supreme Court of Florida is inconsistent with its
conclusion in Pitsirelosregarding what a trial de novo is or is not under the
Lemon Law. Regardless of any evidentiary presumption given the formal
written arbitration board "decision," particularly since it is prepared by the
Florida Attorney General's lawyers, it is a powerful piece of evidence on its
own. The Pitsirelos dissent on this issue recognized that point. 19 This
evidentiary presumption issue is inextricably tied to the trial de novo
analysis since the statute mandates this written "decision" be admitted into
evidence. 20 As this article will demonstrate, the legislature obviously
intended to protect a consumer who is forced to litigate in a trial de novo
after the arbitration process. This piece of evidence is substantial and
persuasive, with or without any presumption, and affords protection to the
consumer if litigation ensues.
Thus, the courts' struggles in Mason I, Mason II, and Pitsirelos, to
force a consumer protection friendly result were unnecessary. The statute,
section 681, has ample built-in protections so that an individual consumer is
not overwhelmed by a manufacturer's litigational resources. That is the
analytical theme of this article. The ultimate and effective resolution of
these errors, however, must rest with the legislature.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

721 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1998).
Id. at 713.
Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 721.
Pitsirelos,721 So. 2d at 711.
Id. at 715.
FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(9) (1999).
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II. LEMON LAW LEGISLATION

A.

What is the Lemon Law?21

Simply put, the Lemon Law allows a consumer to obtain a refund or a
replacement if their motor vehicle meets the requisite statutory criteria.22 The
law defines the meaning of a "Lemon."3 Once statutory prerequisites are
met, a presumption that the motor vehicle has deficiencies is established for
the consumer. 24 This statutory relief is intended to be nonjudicial,
expeditious, and inexpensive.2 An attorney is not needed, although any
party can appear with counsel.26

In order to qualify for relief under the Lemon Law, a motor vehicle
must possess a "nonconformity." The statute defines "nonconformity" as a

21. See generally Robert A. Butterworth, Consumer Guide to the Florida Lemon Law
(1997), which recites, for the lay public, their rights under the law. This article is not intended to
be a practice guide for the Lemon Law. There are no real Continuing Legal Education ("CLE")
publications which are designed to be a tool for the attorney practicing in this field. See Duane
A. Daiker, Note, Florida's Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act: Lemon-Aid for the
Consumer,45 FLA. L. REV. 253 (1993) for a good overview of section 681. A general overview
of the Lemon Law statutory provisions is contained in Raymond G. Ingalsbe, Florida'sNew Car
Lemon Law: An Effective Tool for the Consumer, 64 RtA. B.L 61 (Oct. 1990).
22. FA. STAT. § 681.102(15) (1999).
"Motor vehicle" means a new vehicle, propelled by power other than
muscular power, which is sold in this state to transport persons or property,
and includes a recreational vehicle or a vehicle used as a demonstrator or
leased vehicle if a manufacturer's warranty was issued as a condition of sale,
or the lessee is responsible for repairs, but does not include vehicles run only
upon tracks, off-road vehicles, trucks over 10,000 pounds gross vehicle
weight, motorcycles, mopeds, or the living facilities of recreational vehicles.

Id.
23.
ld. § 681.104(1).
24. Id, § 681.104(3)(a)-(b).
25. "There is no fee for having your case heard by the Florida New Motor Vehicle
Arbitration Board." Butterworth, supranote 21, at 6.
26. "You are not required to have an attorney represent you, although use of an attorney
is permitted (at your expense)." Id.
27. § 681.102(16). See also § 681.103(1), which provides:
"Nonconformity" means a defect or condition that substantially impairs the
use, value, or safety of a motor vehicle, but does not include a defect or
condition that results from an accident, abuse, neglect, modification, or
alteration of the motor vehicle by persons other than the manufacturer or its
authorized service agent.
Id. § 681.102(16).
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condition that substantially impairs value, safety, or use.2 Basically, it
establishes a defect, but obviously this statutory conclusion can be quite
subjective. 29 A Lemon Law arbitration panel is the one to decide if a non-

conformity in the motor vehicle exists.3

3

A motor vehicle is also defined in section 681. Not every vehicle on
the highways falls within the statute.32 While heavy trucks do not, 33 the
nonliving portions of recreational vehicles do. 4 For the vast majority,
however, the Lemon Law operates to benefit consumers who own passenger
cars, sport utility vehicles, and pickup trucks.35
The philosophical foundations for the Lemon Law had their origins in
the consumer protection movement, which began during the 1970s. 31 From
Henry Ford's mass production technology until the advent of this
consumerism, automobile manufacturers and dealers clearly had an
advantage over a purchaser if a car was a "lemon" or was "defective. 3 7 The
normal relief for a consumer was to file a lawsuit seeking common law
remedies, 38 to file a U.C.C. claim, 39 or perhaps an action under the

28.
29.
30.

§ 681.102(16).
See Butterworth, supranote 21, at 2-3.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-32.033 (1993) (Decision of the Board).

31.

FLA. STAT.

§ 681.102(15) (1999).

32. Butterworth, supra note 21, at 2.
33. § 681.102(15) ("but does not include vehicles run only upon tracks, off-road
vehicles, trucks over 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight, motorcycles, mopeds, or the living
facilities of recreational vehicles.").
34. Id. § 681.102(21). "'Recreational vehicle' means a motor vehicle primarily designed
to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use, but does not include
a van conversion." Id.
35. See generally, Butterworth, supranote 21, at 2-3.
36. See Barbara E. Herring, Comment, Sweetening the Fate of the "Lemon" Owner:
California and Connecticut Pass Legislation Dealing with Defective New Cars, 14 U. TOL. L.
REv. 341, 341-43 (1983).
37. The philosophical basis for these laws was to even the otherwise unfair economic
interests favoring the big corporation/manufacturer over the individual consumer. See Harvey M.
Sklaw, The New Jersey Lemon Law: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come, 9 SETON HALL LzGIS.
J. 137, 137 (1985) ("The lemon is the apparently irreparable new automobile; the shiny chrome
plated monster which has turned upon its master. Not only has this monster turned upon the
buyer, but the seller has washed his hands of the whole affair.").
38. See, e.g., McCraney v. Ford Motor Co., 282 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1973).
39. See Tom Bush Volkswagen, Inc. v. Kuntz, 429 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Janet A. Flaccus, The Lemon and its Rejection: Code Language and Its Misconstruction,
9 U. ARK. LrrLE ROCKL.J. 303 (1986-87).
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Magnuson-Moss Act. 40 Except if brought in small or summary claims court,
an attorney and the full legal process applied. This would then, of course,
take time and money.
To eradicate a perceived imbalance which favors the economic power
of the manufacturers, the Florida Legislature in 1983 determined, as a matter
of public policy, that an automobile purchase is a major event in the
financial life of a person, requiring state protection. 42 Section 681.101 of the
FloridaStatutes states in part:
The Legislature recognizes that a motor vehicle is a major
consumer purchase and that a defective motor vehicle undoubtedly
creates a hardship for the consumer ....It is the intent of the
Legislature that a good faith motor vehicle warranty complaint by a
consumer be resolved by the manufacturer within a specified
period of time; ....It is further the intent of the Legislature to
provide the statutory procedures whereby a consumer may receive
a replacement motor vehicle, or a full refund, for a motor vehicle
which cannot be brought into conformity with the warranty
provided for in this chapter.4 3
B.

The Lemon Law ArbitrationBoard

The initial decision-maker in a conflict between a consumer and the
automobile manufacturer is the New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board
("Board"). This structure was first created by legislative amendments to the
Lemon Law in 1988. 44 Before the Board existed, there was no enforcement
mechanism under section 681 for the consumer, except litigation. The legal
rights were created, but the remedy had to be obtained in court.
Arbitration was designed to be an alternative dispute procedure. The
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and Florida Rules of Evidence do not
apply.45 If
a qualified
motor vehicle
under
section 681 oris afound
be a
statutory
"Lemon,"
a repurchase
by the
manufacturer
new to
vehicle
40. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 57a.(a)-(c) (1982). See Gates v. Chrysler Corp., 397 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
41. See Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, SB 0462, at 1(available
at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 18, carton 1281, Tallahassee, Fla.).
42. See FLA. STAT. § 681.101 (1991). See generally Ayala Alexopoulos, A New Twist
for Texas "Lemon" Owners, 17 ST. MARY'S U. 155, 156 (1985).
43. § 681.101.
44. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095 (1988).
45. See FA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 2-32.032(10)(a) (1993) ('T1he formal rules of
evidence shall not apply.").
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replacement is required.46 In the Mason case, the arbitration panel ordered a
refund. 47 Porsche then exercised its statutory right to seek a trial de novo in
circuit court.4 8
There is no constitutional basis for the New Motor Vehicle Arbitration
Board. Arbitrators, for the most part, have no qualification requirements. 4
They are appointed by the Attorney General's Office, three per panel.50 One
arbitrator on51a panel has to be "a person with expertise in motor vehicle
mechanics."
Lemon Law arbitrators are not professionally trained. They are not
required to have special training such as administrative law judges,52
American Arbitration Association qualified individuals, or any other
individuals. The Attorney General's Office is responsible for determining
qualifications and training. 53 Yet, the Attorney General ("AG") also acts as
legal counsel to the Board. Paradoxically, the AG also provides advice to
and answers questions from consumers. 55
The Mason II arbitration involved a 1991 Porsche Carrera 2 high
performance sports car, and the alleged defect was the transmission, among
other things. The expert on the Mason I panel was a technician from a
recreational vehicle ("RV") facility, with no experience with Porsche
Carreras generally, or with the specific tiptronic transmission that was the

46.

FLA. STAT. § 681.104(2)(a)-(b) (1999); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-32.033(5)(d).
47. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 720.
48. Id.
49. § 681.1095(1); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-32.003 (1993). "Each Board member
shall be accountable to the Attorney General for the proper performance of his/her duties as a
member of the Board." Id. at 2-32.005(1). In other contexts, of course, Florida requires specific
qualifications for individuals who arbitrate or mediate disputes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 44.103,
.104,723.038.
50. § 681.1095(3); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-32.004 (1993) (Board Composition;
Compensation; Vacancies).
51. § 681.1095(3) (One member "must not be employed by a manufacturer or a
franchised motor vehicle dealer or be a staff member, a decisionmaker, or a consultant for a
procedure."); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-32.004(2) (1993).
52. See FLA. STAT. § 120.65 (1999).
53. Id. § 681.1095(3); FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-32.004 (1993).
54. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-32.006(2) (1993).
55. The consumer testified in Mason I to advice and help received from the Attorney
General's Office. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 719. See Butterworth, supra note 21, printed in inside
cover, for a guide that "represents the Attorney General's interpretation of the [Lemon Law].
... If you have a question or are uncertain about a particular aspect of this law, contact the
Lemon Law Hotline operated by the Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services, or write
the Office of the Attorney General, Lemon Law Arbitration Program." Id.
56. Mason II, 688 So. 2d at 363 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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mechanical component in dispute. 57 Not one member of the Mason Board
had ever driven such a vehicle, or knew anything about this type of high
performance sports car.5
59
These arbitration hearings usually last about two hours. Test rides are
permitted, 60 but not required. In Mason, only a very brief test ride was used
to help determine that the car was a "Lemon., 61 The entire process lasted
one hour and fifty minutes.62
C.

Legislative History of Section 681

There is little, at best, for guidance. The staff analysis fails to define or
explain trial de novo. It simply says: "Appeals to circuit court are to be de
novo." 63 Further, unlike other statutory provisions, neither section 681 nor
its le~slative history says anything about who has the burden in the trial de
novo.

Before the 1988 amendments, section 681 contained no specific
provision about going to circuit court by appeal, trial de novo, or otherwise.
Initially, there were no arbitration boards. Some type of judicial proceeding
was envisioned, however, since the statute referred to bad faith claims, 65 and
the court awarding attorneys' fees to a prevailing consumer.6 The 1988

57. Deposition of Robert C. France, November 15, 1994, P. 8, L. 1-6; P. 28, L. 5-22; P.
40, L. 18-23; P. 55-57 (did not recall anything unique about the transmission).
58. At the deposition, none of the arbitrators remembered anything about the
transmission, or its characteristics. This was the central issue since the 1991 Porsche Carrera 2
had a tiptronic transmission. It provided the driver with the unique opportunity to either drive the
car like an automatic, or a stick shift. See Deposition of Sidney Mehr, November 14, 1994, Case
No. C1 94-1691, at 23-25.
59. Butterworth, supranote 21, at 6.
60. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-32.032(10)(b) (1993).
61. Masonl,688So.2dat364.
62. The audio hearing tape was turned off at 3:05 P.M. and restarted at 3:30 P.M. on
June 16, 1992. In that 25 minute period, two test drives were done. That 25 minutes also
included having to go from the I lth floor of the building, to the parking lot, and back to the 11 th
floor. Estimates on the length of the test rides varied from 5 to 20 minutes. Deposition of
William H. Willis, Nov. 14, 1992, at P. 47, L. 6--11; Trial Transcript, Feb. 7, 1995, Vol. VII, P.
670-671. See Mehr, supranote 58, atP. 35-37, P. 61, L. 1-11.
63. Staff of Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Senate Staff Analysis and Economic
Impact Statement, S.B. 556, at 3 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, carton 1720,
Tallahassee, Fla.).
64. See FLA. STAT. § 194.036(3) (1987).
65. FLA. STAT. § 681.106 (1983) ("found by the court").
66. FA. STAT. § 681.104(5)(b) (1983); HB 885 4/19/83 Report, Committee on
Judiciary.
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revision was "a clarification that an appeal of a board decision to the circuit
court must be trial de novo." 67
What the legislature initially did in 1983 was to create certain statutory
rights for a consumer, while placing legal duties upon the manufacturer.68 In
essence, a cause of action is created for the consumer whereby, if the
statutory requisites are met, a court action could be filed against the
manufacturer. 69 If a lawsuit was filed, the consumer would be a plaintiff and
have to prove his/her case of a statutory violation consistent with traditional
notions of burdens of proof and persuasion.
The law also allowed
manufacturers to set up informal dispute resolution panels. 7 ' These have to
be certified by the Division of Consumer Services. 7 2 If all rules are
followed, a consumer first has to bring the motor vehicle claim there as a
condition precedent to seeking judicial redress under section 681. 73 The
idea, of course, is that this may avoid litigation and informally resolve a
consumer complaint. There are some guarantees of fairness since these
manufacturers' informal dispute panels have to conform to federal
regulations, and must be certified by a state agency. 74 Additionally, the
division can appoint "at least one member of the informal dispute settlement
panel."" In 1985, qualifications were put in place to avoid training if a
person was a law graduate qualified arbitrator, mediator, or had already
undergone division training. No such prequalification is required.
Apparently, there is a legislative view that guarantees of fairness
existed in these manufacturer created and state certified informal dispute
67. Conm Substituted for Senate Bill 556, Statement of Substantial Changes, CS/SB
556 (Apr. 14, 1988) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 18, carton 1720,
Tallahassee, Fla.).
68. Staff of Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Senate Staff Analysis and Economic
Impact Statement, SB 743, at 1 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 18, carton
1402, Tallahassee, Fla.). Staff of Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Senate Staff Analysis and
Economic Impact Statement, SB 0462 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 18,
carton 1281, Tallahassee, Fla.). See Maserati Automobiles, Inc. vs. Caplan, 522 So. 2d 993 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988). This case was decided under the 1983 law, prior to the establishment of
the arbitration boards. Id.
69. FLA. STAT. § 681.101 (1991) (legislative intent).
70. Senate Staff Analysis, supra note 41, at 2.
71. FLA. STAT. § 681.109 (1991).
72. FLA. STAT. § 681.108 (1983).
73. Id. § 681.108(1). Some states are similar to Florida in that a consumer must first
seek redress in the manufacturer's informal dispute resolution procedures, if the programs are
certified. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179G) (1999).
74. 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1999).
75. FLA. STAT. § 681.108 (1983).
76. No such training or exempt status prerequisites are required for Lemon Law
arbitration members.
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procedures. Today, a consumer is still required to initially resort to them, 77
and if the consumer prevails this result can be admitted into evidence in a
section 681 court proceeding.
Underlying this is the obvious fact that a
manufacturer, after going to all the trouble to get its program certified, will
settle the dispute if a loss occurs at its own informal dispute proceedings. If
not, the consumer has a favorable piece of evidence to offer a judge or jury.
D.

Other States and Other Laws

The Florida statutory program generally tracks those of other states.79
Florida's 1983 statute was patterned after that of Connecticut' S.8 By 1989,
forty-four states and the District of Columbia had lemon laws.81 When
Florida established it's state-run arbitration program in 1988, Connecticut
programs.81
New York, Massachusetts, and Vermont already had similar
3
differently.8
Different states, of course, run their programs
No specific reported case decision has been found which interpreted the
statutory language of trial de novo within the context of a lemon law judicial
proceeding after arbitration. A review of other state statutes does not further
clarify the issue. Most statutes only refer to a "trial de novo. Interestingly,
the terminology "appeal," as used in the FloridaStatutes, is not uniform. In
this respect, the Georgia statute is particularly interesting.86 It uses the word
"appeal," but a consumer may reject the arbitration decision and "request a
trial de novo of the arbitration decision in superior court."' s The Texas
77. FLA. STAT. § 681.108(1) (1999).
78. Id. See Staff of Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Senate Staff Analysis and
Economic Impact Statement, S.B. 743 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 18,
carton 1402, Tallahassee, Fla.).
79. The Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement indicated that "[i]n

recognition of consumer dissatisfactions, some states have enacted legislation to allow.., a full
refund of the purchase price on a new car to replace the defective one." Senate Staff Analysis,
note 41, at 1.

80.

Id. at2.

81. Lawrence A. Towers, Lemon Law Litigation,TRAL, Feb. 1989, at 22.
82. Senate Staff Analysis, supranote 63, at 6. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-181 to
42-184 (West Supp. 1999).
83. See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Consumer Product WarrantyActs § 68 (1990) for a listing of

state statutes on "lemon laws."
84. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 4811-4(d) (1993); IDAHO CODE § 48-907 (Supp. 1999); IowA
CODE ANN. § 322G.8(6) (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325P.665(7) (West 1990); WASH.
REv. CoDEANN. § 19.118.100(1) (West 1999).
85. See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-788 (1994); see also Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90 §
7Nl/2(6) (West 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-D:6 (1995).

86. GA. CoDEANN. § 10-1-788 (1994).
87. Id.
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88

statute is similar. This seems to imply a judicial proceeding that would be
a new one from the outset.
The New York statute provides that arbitrations are to be conducted by
the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). 8 9 The arbitration is final
there
and binding.•9° In New York,
•
• 91are "professional" arbitrators or
arbitrators from firms who are impartial. There is no right to trial by jury
or trial de novo.92 Constitutional attacks on grounds of denial of trial by jury
and access to courts have been rejected in New York. 93
Vermont's statute is interesting in several ways.94 First, that the
Arbitration Board is appointed by the Governor, and at least one member has
to be a new car dealer.95 Members are appointed for three year terms.
"[O]ne member and one alternate shall be persons knowledgeable in
automobile mechanics." 96 The Vermont Arbitration Board receives
"administrative services from the transportation board." 97 It is the
Arbitration Board in Vermont which promulgates its own rules, quite
unlike Florida where the Attorney General sets the rules. This Board's
composition seems more analogous to a commission, which may be
appointed in Florida by the Governor, such as the Public Service
Commission. Additionally, Vermont's arbitration board decision is truly
only reviewable by appeal to the superior court. 99 A specific statutory

88. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985).
89. See In re Subaru of Am., 532 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
90. IcL at 619. In New York, the scope of judicial review is limited. IM at 618; 5 N.Y.
JuR. 2d ArbitrationandAward § 180 (1997).
91. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State, 540 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (Sup. Ct. 1989); N.Y.
GENERAL Bus.mss LAw § 198-a(k) (McKinney 1999).
92. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91.
93. Id. See also Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Schachner, 525 N.Y.S.2d 127, 130 (Sup. Ct.
1988). In his special Pitsirelos opinion, Justice Overton raised this issue, although it was not
before the court. He was of the view there was no right to ajury trial since a Lemon Law cause of
action did not exist at common law. Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d 710, 716 (Fla.
1998).
94. New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4176(a) (1993).
95.
l § 4174(a).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. § 4174(b).
99. § 4176(a). See Pecor v. General Motors Corp., 547 A.2d 1364, 1365 (Vt. 1988). In
In re Villeneuve, the Vermont Supreme Court described well the review scope after a board
decision. 709 A.2d 1067 (Vt. 1998). Under Vermont's statute, it is a limited review. Id at 1069.
Villeneuve is helpful in understanding the informality and problems which arise at these
arbitration proceedings, referring to a board member's comment about a fist fight. Id at 107071.
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burden was established "by clear and convincing evidence.' 'lro Further, the
grounds for modification or vacation are specified by statute and appear
quite rigorous, such as corruption, fraud, and "evident partiality. ' 101
Connecticut's statute provides for de novo review on "questions of law
raised in the application." 1 z This seems more like a certiorari review. The
statute provides, "the court shall uphold the award unless it determines that
the factual findings of the arbitrators are not supported by substantial
evidence in the record and that the substantial rights of the moving party
have been prejudiced." 10 3 Under the Connecticut statute, arbitrators are
appointed by the Commissioner of Consumer Protection, but only one of the
three member panel can be from
the industry. ° 4 The Department may also
105
AAA.
refer the dispute to the
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Ass'n v. O'Neill,1°6 the Supreme
Court of Connecticut held that a manufacturer's right to a jury trial, with a
lemon law claim, had not been unconstitutionally denied.1 7 The Connecticut
statute allows the consumer, if dissatisfied with the arbitration award, to
100. New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4176(a) (1993).
101. Id. The specific provisions are as follows:
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means;
(2) there was evident partiality by the board or corruption or
misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party by the board;
(3) the board exceeded its powers;
(4) the board refused to postpone a hearing after being shown
sufficient cause to do so or refused to hear evidence material to the
controversy or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to the rules
promulgated by the board so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party.
Id. The case of Muzzy v. Chevrolet Division, General Motors Corp. discussed at length the
burden of proof and standard of review on "appeal." 571 A.2d 609, 612-14 (Vt. 1989). One
of the points made was the intent to have the board decisions be similar to an arbitration award
under Vermont's Arbitration Act. Id. at 612. The judicial review of an arbitration award was
the same as under the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 9(d) (1994). See also In re
Villeneuve, 709 A.2d 1067 (Vt. 1998) (ruling on scope of review on due process as to
administrative board with members who did not personally hear the evidence).
102. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-181(c)(4) (West Supp. 1999).
103. Id. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. O'Neill, 523 A.2d 486 (Conn. 1987)
[hereinafter "O'Neill F']. Florida's original statute was intended to be modeled after
Connecticut's statute. Staff of Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Senate Staff Analysis and
Economic Impact Statement, S.B. 794, at 3 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser.
18, carton 1281, Tallahassee, Fla.).
104. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-181(a) (West Supp. 1999).
105. Id.
106. 561 A.2d 917 (Conn. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in General Motors
Corp. v. Dohmann, 722 A.2d 1205 (Conn. 1998) [hereinafter "O'Neill I'].
107. Id at 921-22.
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initiate a de novo civil proceeding. 108 For the manufacturer, however, its de
novo review is more limited, similar to a judicial review after a formal
arbitration proceeding. 10 9
Although the O'Neill court found it
unconstitutional that the consumer has more judicial opportunities available
than the manufacturer, its analysis centered around the traditional scope of
review depending upon whether the procedure is deemed to be compulsory
versus voluntary arbitration." 0 The Connecticut procedures intend an
altogether different de novo proceeding than in Florida."' Although the
Connecticut statute is silent on the point, apparently the burden isupon the
party challenging the arbitration award.11 2
I
In a later decision, General Motors Corp. v. Dohmann,'1 - the Supreme
Court of Connecticut reviewed the factual record to determine if substantial
evidence supported the arbitration board's decision. 1 4 That review is more
limited, and by statute the Connecticut Legislature tied judicial review of
lemon law arbitration decisions to the same standard as an administrative
agency. A Connecticut de novo review is not a trial de novo, as arguably
intended in Florida. The court will simply determine whether there is a basis
for the factual findings and it will not substitute its judgment for that of the
arbitration board.! 5 The Connecticut law does provide,
however, that
116
questions of law are determined de novo by the court. Since an arbitration
board is not a legally trained body, any issue of law must be determined by a
court. This statutory procedure in Connecticut makes it quite different from
that of Florida.
In Minnesota, the statute allows for a trial de novo as well, but nothing
is found to further explain what is meant by that term." 7 This statute does
specifically deal with the admissibility of an informal dispute settlement
11
award and any presumptive validity to be given it.
The Minnesota statute
provides: "A written decision issued by an informal dispute settlement

108. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-181(f) (West Supp. 1999)
109. See id. §§ 42-179(i)-42-181(c), 52-417-52-420.
110. O'Neill II, 561 A.2d at 924-25.
111. The de novo review is limited to the substantial evidence test. General Motors Corp.
v. Garito, 1997 WL 804876, at *2 (Conn. Super. 1997).
112. Id.
113. 722 A.2d 1205 (Conn. 1998).
114. Id. at 1205.
115. Id. at 1210.
116. Id.
117. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665(1) (West 1990).
118. The Minnesota "arbitration" procedure seems to be based on Magnuson-Moss
certified informal dispute procedures. See Pfeiffer v. Ford Motor Co., 517 N.W.2d 76, 78-79
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994); see also Automobile Importers of Am. v. Minnesota, 871 F.2d 717, 71922 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).
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mechanism, and any written findings upon which the decision is based, are
admissible as nonbinding evidence in any subsequent legal action and are
not subject to further foundation requirements."'1 9 This type of Minnesota
provision in the Florida Statutes would have changed the procedural and
evidentiary holdings in Mason I and Mason II and rendered Pitsirelos at
least partially unnecessary. The Florida statute does not say anything about
the evidentiary effect of the arbitration award, only that it is admissible. It
would have been better for the Florida Legislature to have said something on
this subject as it has in other contexts, instead of nothing.
In Texas, lemon law disputes are handled by the Texas Motor
The Texas law allows a consumer to reject the
Commission. 2°
Commission's decision and seek a trial de novo. The Commission's
decision is not admissible into evidence. 121 The manufacturer, on the other
hand, can only seek a limited judicial review, with no similar exclusion of an
adverse Commission decision.' 22 A legal proceeding by manufacturers
challenging the makeup of the Commission, incidentally whose majority
number are "automobile dealers," was rejected in Chrysler Corp. v. Texas
Motor Vehicle Commission." 3 This case also held that it is constitutional to
allow consumers two shots at a manufacturer where in the subsequent
lawsuit the Commission's decision does not come into evidence. 24 A trial
de novo in Texas for the consumer is truly as if nothing occurred
previously. 125
Finally, a District of Columbia law has some requirements regarding
arbitrator qualifications, which are not present in the FloridaStatutes.1 26 Of
seven board members, two shall be attorneys, one from the Department of
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, two shall have training and experience in
119. MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 325F.665(7) (emphasis added).

120. TE REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07 (West Supp. 1999). See generally
Ayala Alexopoulos, A New Twist for Texas "Lemon" Owners, 17 ST. MARY'S W. 155, 172-78

(1985).
121. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (36), § 6.07 (West Supp. 1999).
122. Alexopoulos, supranote 120, at 172.
123. 755F.2d 1192(5thCir. 1985).

124. Id. at 1202.
125. The court explained:
There is nothing procedurallyunfair about allowing a car purchaser a second

shot at a manufacturer. Its effect is to enhance the claimant's chances of
winning, but only because he can first attempt to persuade the Commission of
his case. Failing in this concededly more expeditious and limited claim route,

where a manufacturer faces much less exposure and a successful purchaser's
claims will likely end, the purchaser is back to where he was before the lemon

law - free to pursue his suit as long as his purse and his patience endure.
Id at 1202 (emphasis added).
126. D.C. CT. Crv. ARBrMATIONPROGRAM R. III.
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"arbitration and mediation," one member shall have consumer interests
training, and the final to be a person with experience or training in the
manufacture, wholesale, or retail sales of consumer goods. 27 This statute
seems to present a more balanced and professional arbitration board than in
Florida, where the Attorney General basically selects members, without
requiring any of the skills or experience imposed by the D.C. law.
B.

A.

CASE DECISION ANALYSIS ON TRIAL DE Novo

From Mason I through Pitsirelos

In 1991, section 681.1095(12) of the Florida Statutes, provided as
follows:
An appeal of a decision by the board to the circuit court by a
consumer or a manufacturer shall be by trial de novo. In a written
petition to appeal a decision by the board, the appealing party must
state the action requested and the grounds relied upon for appeal.12
Clearly, it is not the best written provision. 29 The court in Mason I
acknowledged this.130 The court then held that a judicial proceeding
subsequent to a lemon law arbitration board is more in the nature of an
"appeal," and therefore "it [was] generally the burden of the appellant to
show that the lower tribunal erred.' ' 131 The lower tribunal being referred to
is the AG-selected arbitration board. The result in Mason I requires the
aggrieved party, no matter who, to have the burden of proof and in essence
be the appellant/plaintiff at the trial de novo.
This is really an appeal and
not a trial de novo as if nothing had occurred previously. Mason I also holds
that the manufacturer shoulders the burden of going forward to disprove that
33
the vehicle is defective, or to prove that it is not presumptively defective.
In the first trial after Mason I, which was an interlocutory appeal, the
consumer as the plaintiff went first but Porsche had the burden to disprove
that the vehicle was a "Lemon."'' 3 Mason H criticized the trial court for
127. § 40-1303(c).
128. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(13) (1991). See Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc.,
621 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
129. The appellate courts have called this provision "inartfully" worded. Mason 1, 621
So. 2d at 722.
130. Id. at 721.
131. Id.
132. Id.at722-23.
133. Id. at 722.
134. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 722.
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making the consumer be the plaintiff at all135 and characterized those
proceedings in looking glass terms of Lewis Carroll as "curiouser and
curiouser. 136 Of course, this curious procedure arose only because of the
Mason I holding that a trial de novo is not really de novo. 137 Mason II,
including the reversal of a directed verdict for Porsche, among other things,
held that a decision of the arbitration board has a presumption of correctness
which goes to the jury like that.138 The party who challenges that decision
has the burden of proof to demonstrate it is invalid. 39 Absent such proof,
the consumer wins.
In Sheehan v. Winnebago Industries, Inc.,14° the Fifth District Court of
Appeal, after Mason I, again determined that although a judicial proceeding
subsequent to an arbitration board hearing is de novo, it is procedurally more
analogous to an appeal.1 41 The party who loses at the arbitration level is the
plaintiff, and has the burden of proof de novo. 142 With no independent
analysis, the Third District Court of Appeal, in Aguiar v. FordMotor Co.,143
followed Mason .144 In GeneralMotors Corp. v. Neu,' 45 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal held that an appeal to the circuit court under section
681.1095 of the FloridaStatutes should be to the trial division, and not the
appellate division of the circuit court.146 A mandamus was granted directing
the circuit court to conduct a trial, as it was wrong to have transferred the
case to the appellate division of that court. 147 Neu did not address, as did
Mason I, issues of the burden of persuasion, who would be a plaintiff or
petitioner, or how the de novo proceeding was to be conducted. Mason I is
not cited in Neu, although it may be that the Fourth District did not yet know
of the decision.'48

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Mason I, 688 So. 2d at 364.
Id.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

635 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 1067.
Id. at 1068.
683 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 1158.
617 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 408.

Id.
I. at 369-70.
Id

148. Initially, Mason was docketed in the appellate division of the circuit court, and given

an appellate case number, A1-92-34. When the trial court ordered the consumer to file a new
lawsuit, a regular case number was given to the proceedings. See Mason 1,621 So. 2d at 721 n.1.
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Subsequently, in Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos,149 the Fourth District held
that Chrysler had the "burden to demonstrate any error or abuse of discretion
to the reviewing tribunal."15
The "tribunal" being referred to is the
Arbitration Board. The court said Neu is "inapposite,".' 51 and used the same
"appeal" language as Mason I to interpret a de novo proceeding.152 The
Fourth District in Pitsirelosmade this statement:
The legislature has deemed the circuit court action as an "appeal"
from an adverse arbitration decision. As in any appeal, it is the
appellant's burden to demonstrate any error or abuse of discretion
to the reviewing tribunal [circuit court de novo].
No other
1 53
interpretation of this statutory scheme is reasonable.
Pitsirelos' reference to "error" or "abuse of discretion" was unfortunate and
154
only further clouded exactly what type of proceeding is this de novo trial.
The lower court's Pitsireloslanguage gave an even different meaning to trial
de novo than Mason I, although the latter case was cited with approval. 55
Under the Fourth District's Pitsirelosdecision, the circuit court presumably
looks at the record similar to how it might review an administrative
proceeding under section 120 of the FloridaStatutes or an appellate review
by certiorari. Chrysler then took the case to Tallahassee, and to the Supreme
Court of Florida.
The Supreme Court of Florida, on this trial de novo point, affirmed the
Fourth District. 56 Thus, Mason I is followed by the Supreme Court of
Florida, which states that they "agree with the conclusion" reached by the
Fifth District in Mason. 57 Any in-depth reasoning by the court never
develops on this issue, and Pitsirelosdoes nothing to examine the analytical
foundation of the case law precedents Mason I found persuasive. Only
149. 689 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997), review granted, 697 So. 2d 1215

(Fla. 1997).
150. Id. at 1134.
151. Id. at 1133.
152. The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Hargrettv. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.,
denied certiorari as the appropriate way to handle the burden of proof issue. 705 So. 2d. 1009
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998). The court did not find the presence of irreparable harm. Id. at
1009. Petitioner (consumer) had argued that the trial court placed on her the burden of going
forward even though she won at arbitration. Id.
153. Pitsirelos,689 So. 2d at 1134. The First, Second, and Third Districts did not have
any opinions in this area.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1133.
156. Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 710, 711 (Fla. 1998).
157. Id. at 713.
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Justice Overton, in a partial dissenting opinion, said that a trial de novo
should be exactly that---"'a new trial... as ifno trial whatever had been
held in the first instance.'' 5 8 Yet Justice Overton made no attempt to
examine the paradox created by the Pitsirelosmajority of a trial de novo not
meaning what it is facially intended to mean.
What seems to be motivating the Supreme Court of Florida in Pitsirelos
was the fact that the Lemon Law is an alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") procedure. It is intended to benefit the consumer, be quick and
economical. Pitsirelos adopts, without saying so directly, the "way station"
analogy from Mason I to reach its result. Thus, according to that analogy, if
a prevailing consumer at the arbitration board has to also be the party with
the burden in a subsequent circuit court trial, this does "relegate the
mandatory arbitration to simply being a procedural impediment to the
consumer prior to accessing the circuit court without the counter-balancing
benefit to which the prevailing party in the arbitration should be entitled." 159
As an ADR procedure, the Supreme Court of Florida apparently thought that
if it is any other way, the arbitration proceeding becomes meaningless.
Pitsirelos takes a pro consumer approach on the trial de novo, but then
undermines the same rationale by holding that the arbitration result carries
no evidentiary presumption.
The supreme court in Pitsirelos did not examine too deeply section
681. 6o Admittedly, there is sparse legislative analysis for guidance. As
noted, nowhere in the legislative history is "trial de novo" defined or
explained. Unlike other statutory provisions, neither section 681 nor its
legislative history says anything about who has the burden in the trial de
novo. Mason I and Pitsirelossuperimposed a specific legislative intent onto
the statute. Yet, the Staff Analysis simply said: "Appeals to circuit court are
to be de novo."161 Arguably, if the legislature intended the burden to be on
the party wanting a trial de novo, it could have said so as it has in other
statutory16 provisions-for example, section 194.036(3) of the Florida
Statutes.

T

The ink had not yet dried on Pitsirelosbefore the Fifth District began
demonstrating how this strained concept of a trial de novo works in practice.
This most recent Fifth District case, FordMotor Co. v. Starling 63 reinforces

158. Id. at 715 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1505 (6th ed. 1990)) (emphasis
added).
159. Id. at 713.
160. Id. at 710.
161. Senate Staff Analysis, supranote 63, at 3.
162. FLA. STAT. § 194.036(3) (1997).
163. 721 So. 2d 335 (Fla.5th Dist Ct. App. 1998). Starling was decided on October 9,
1998. Id. at 335. Pitsireloswas decided on September 17, 1998. Pitsirelos,721 So. 2d at 710.
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that court's view of the de novo trial as an appellate proceeding. 64 There,
the court affirmed a finding for the consumer after a bench trial. 65 Ford
"appealed" the arbitration board's decision in favor of the consumer, a
recreational vehicle purchaser. 166 Even though Starling uses the de novo
language, the circuit court proceeding was more analogous to an appeal. This
conclusion is supported by the following language from Starling: "Even
though this was a de novo review, it was still an appeal. Issues not raised
before the arbitrator should not be presented during the de novo review or
else the entire statutory arbitration process becomes a nullity."' 67 As such,
Starling criticizes Ford for raising a new issue at trial that they had not
argued earlier in the arbitration. A pure trial de novo, however, would not
preclude the presentation of new issues and evidence. The Fifth District
treats this like a matter that has not first been raised at the lower "tribunal,"
which cannot then be asserted on "appeal" for the first time.168 The Fifth
District's application of de novo to the Starling facts is no different from
looking at an appellate record. That is, if Ford did not first raise the issue
before the lower "tribunal," or the arbitration panel, then they could not then
first assert it on "appeal" to the circuit court. On this issue, the dissent in
Starling argues that on a trial de novo, new issues can be raised, and even
implies a constitutional deprivation if such is not the case. 169 Although this
dissenting opinion is more correct in its "de novo" application, unfortunately
the theory being espoused is also contrary to the rationale behind Pitsirelos
and the Fifth District's own Mason I decision.
B.

Mason I and PitsirelosWere Wrongly Decided

In Mason I, the court attempts to grapgle with what it thought, with the
help of the Attorney General's Office,
is a "clear" statute, although
inartfully drafted, but one which should not be interpreted to "lead to an
inequitable and absurd result. ' 171 Nevertheless, an "absurd result" is
reached. The pivotal issue of first impression in Mason I, which is
subsequently relied on by Pitsirelos became the interpretation of section
681.1095(12) of the FloridaStatutes. 72
164. Starling, 721 So. 2d at 335.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 336.
167. Id. at 338. This comment by the court harkens back to the "way station" analogy of
Mason I and the arbitration process becoming meaningless.
168. Starling, 721 So. 2d at 338 n.7.
169. Id. at340-41.
170. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 722.
171. Id. at 723.
172. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(12) (1999).
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The Mason I trial court had ruled in favor of the manufacturer and
ordered a traditional trial de novo on the issues of section 681, and the
consumer's other claims under Magnuson-Moss and revocation of the sale
against the dealership.173 Mason rs conundrum arises since section
681.1095(12) uses the dual terminology of "appeal of a decision by the
board," and that a manufacturer or consumer shall be entitled to a "trial de
novo."174 The Fifth District attached primary significance to this "appeal"
language.175 Mason I, however, fails to consider the possibility
that this
"appeal" reference is only procedural, with no substantive force. 17
Certainly the Attorney General's amicus argument in Mason I that the
1988 revision intended to "balance the economic interests of litigants who
otherwise might be unevenly matched" 177 had, arguendo, an unstated social
or philosophical impact on the panel.1 78 That is, from the societal
standpoint, if an economically undermatched consumer wins at arbitration, it
is unfair to have that same party file a lawsuit and then to have the burden of
proof against a manufacturer who sits in a superior economic position.
During oral argument in Mason I, questions were asked that
demonstrated a concern for the consumer being worn down by litigation, if
all the manufacturer had to do was request a trial de novo every time it lost
at arbitration. 179 The panel's view was that the litigation resources of a
motor vehicle manufacturer were greater than an individual's and potential
abuse of the consumer's rights would occur. 10 This theme permeates Mason
L The Fifth District says as much when it speaks of the arbitration board
becoming meaningless, if all a manufacturer has to do is ask for a trial de
novo, since arbitration would then "amount to nothing more than a way
station for a disgruntled party en route to circuit court.'"8I In other words,
manufacturers would use the de novo proceedings as a strategic weapon to
the detriment of a weaker consumer and the litigation flood gates would then
be opened.
As noted in the published opinion, the court in Mason I thought the
manufacturer's argument that trial de novo means a completely new
proceeding was disingenuous. 8 2 That panel did not think the manufacturer
173. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 721.

174. l
175. Id.
176. Id. at 723.
177. Id.
178. Mason I,621 So. 2d at 723.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. l at 722. This "way station" analogy was from Bystrom v. Equitable Life
AssuranceSoc'y, 416 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
182. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 722.
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would be making the same interpretation of trial de novo if it had prevailed
at the arbitration level. 183 This is wrong. Adopting Porsche's argument on
trial de novo would not have resulted in the consumer being treated any
differently than a manufacturer in a subsequent lawsuit. The usual burdens
of proof and persuasion would apply. Also, the manufacturer, just like a
consumer, would then get the statutory benefit of having the arbitration
result go into evidence.
Mason I did not attempt to fully analyze section 681, as undertaken in
this article. Neither did that court accurately analyze in detail the statutory
provisions and case law upon which it relied as precedent to conclude that
the trial de novo provisions of section 681.1095(13) of the Florida Statutes
were meant to be like an appeal with the burden on the appealing party, the
appellant. Section 681 the court in Mason I stated, does not provide for the
classical trial de novo.
[T]he statute is clear that once the arbitration board makes its
findings, the aggrieved party may appeal to the circuit court.
Although most appellate proceedings do not include a trial or
evidentiary hearing, the statutory appellate procedure for Florida's
lemon law authorizes a trial de novo. Nevertheless, it is generally
the burden of the appellant to show that the lower tribunal erred.
The issue in this case has arisen because section 681.1095 does not
explicitly18place
the burden of persuasion on either the appellant or
appellee. 5
What the court in Mason I used as precedent for its holding were zoning and
ad valorem tax statutes.186 When analyzed and broken down, these statutes
are not support for the construction given to section 681.1095(12) by Mason
I. The Lemon Law statute is a totally different statutory scheme, for
example, from a property appraiser's valuation of property and the
subsequent legal disputes over those taxes.
1. Mason I's Improper Reliance on Zoning Laws
Some of the statutes discussed in Mason I have been repealed. 187 City
of Ormond Beach v. Del Marco,188 relied on in Mason I, also has as its origin
183. Id.

184. Id.
185. Id. at 721.
186. Id. at 722.
187. Ch. 85-55, § 19, 1985 Fla. Laws 207, 235.
188. 426 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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the Fifth District.1 8 9 There, section 163.250, a zoning statute, allowed for
either a review by the circuit court trial de novo or by certiorari.' 90 Del
Marco involved a Board of Adjustment denying a zoning variance for a
windmill. 91 The case is silent on what happened at the zoning officer level
before the property owner went to the Board of Adjustment. 19z Presumably,
the property owner lost, otherwise there would have been no necessity for
Board action. This is important because the Board of Adjustment could ste
into the shoes of the administrative official and provide the same relief.A
Thus, unlike Mason I, where the arbitration board is the first stop, the Del
Marco complaining party has already initially been rebuffed by an
administrative official at the first level.
When looking at what Del Marco says about trial de novo under then
section 163.250, it is not a statute that Mason I should have analogized to the
Lemon Law. This is what the Del Marco court states about a trial de novo:
A "trial de novo" then must signify the legislative intent that circuit
court review involve something more than a mere examination of
the record of the board of adjustment. The "trial de novo" signifies
to us the legislative intent that the circuit court take new evidence
and conduct a new proceeding, not for the purpose of reviewing the
action of the board of adjustment, but for the purpose of acting as
the board of adjustment to review the original action of the
administrative official, and to grant such relief as194the board of
adjustment could grant, if a proper showing is made.
This language makes the point that in a trial de novo, the circuit court
essentially steps into the shoes of the board of adjustment, and can grant the
variance. The court does so, however, on a clean slate conducting a "new
proceeding" de novo and taking "new evidence."
Mason I seemed to miss that point. The property owner in this zoning
context had the burden of establishing the basis for a variance, which the
circuit court could grant just like the Board of Adjustment. 19 That property
owner also had the burden in court to establish entitlement to the variance,
which is no different than his or her burden before the Board of

189. Id. at 1029. Judge Dauksch, a member of the Mason I panel, was also on the City of
Ormond Beach court.
190. Id. at 1032.
191. Id. at 1030.
192. Id.
193. DelMarco,426 So. 2d at 1032.
194. Ua
195. Id.
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Adjustment. 196 The "aggrieved party," or the party seeking relief in Del
Marco, was the property owner.' 9 If the Board of Adjustment permitted the
variance, there would have been no need for any court proceeding. 9 8 "So, to
secure relief in a trial de novo before the circuit court, the aggrieved party
must make the showing required by section 163.225, and where, as here, the
petition is based on hardship, the aggrieved party has the burden of
demonstrating that a hardship exists."'
The underlying "aggrieved paty"
in Mason L the consumer, is the one making the Lemon Law claim, just
like the person seeking a zoning variance. Yet, Mason I says the
2
manufacturer is the "aggrieved party" because it lost at arbitration. 01
However, in a subsequent trial de novo context, who is the aggrieved party at
an administrative level should not matter.
Neither the Del Marco case nor Mason I evaluates what the trial de
novo proceeding should have been if someone other than the property owner,
as the aggrieved party, files in circuit court under section 163.250 of the
Florida Statutes. Section 163.250 seems to contemplate this, although its
provisions do not define an "officer, department, board, commission, or
bureau of the governing body" as an "aggrieved party. ' ' 2 Thus, it is left
open as to who has the burden and who is the plaintiff. An aggrieved party,
under this zoning statute, is referring to the property owner since that is the
person who has to demonstrate "that a hardship exists." 2°3 If the
governmental authority, however, requests a trial de novo, then under the
Del Marco language cited above, the court stands in the shoes of the Board
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Del Marco, 426 So. 2d at 1032.
199. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 163.225(3)(a) (1981). The analogy of the "aggrieved" party
under section 163 to the issue at the arbitration board under section 681 is out of place. In the
zoning variance situation, the property owner will probably always be the "aggrieved" party.
200. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 720.
201. Id. at 721-22.
202. See FLA. STAT. § 163.250 (1981). Section 163.250 states:
Judicial review of decisions of board of adjustment. - Any person or
persons, jointly or severally, aggrieved by any decision of the board of
adjustment, or any officer, department, board, commission, or bureau of the
governing body, may apply to the circuit court in the judicial circuit where
the board of adjustment is located for judicial relief within 30 days after
rendition of the decision by the board of adjustment. Review in the circuit
court shall be either by a trial de novo, which shall be governed by the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, or by petition for writ of certiorari, which
shall be governed by the Florida Appellate Rules. The election of remedies
shall lie with the appellant.
Id.
203. Del Marco, 426 So. 2d at 1032. See FLA. STAT. § 163.225(3)(a) (1981).
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of Adjustment. The circuit court would hear and decide whether a zoning
variance should be awarded if the property owner proves entitlement, for
example, if a "hardship" can be demonstrated. 20 4 It should not matter,
because it is a new proceeding, de novo. Thus, the person seeking the
variance, no matter the forum, still has the burden to prove the "hardship."' 5
The intent of this zoning statute, arguably, was to have an all new
circuit court trial de novo proceeding. The burden on the party trying to
obtain the variance is no different from the consumer trying to show a
Lemon Law violation under section 681. 206 In a trial de novo, the consumer,
among other things, is trying to prove the motor vehicle was a lemon, and
has the benefit of certain statutory presumptions.2W To be consistent with
how the Fifth District discusses trial de novo in Del Marco, their
interpretation of that same concept in Mason I should have resulted, instead,
with the trial court being affirmed and the consumer designated as the
plaintiff in the section 681 trial de novo. Yet, the court in Mason I says this
about Del Marco:
The case law interpreting this statute [Section 163.250] made clear
that the aggrieved party seeking a trial de novo had the burden of
proving his claim.... As this court stated in Del Marco, in a trial
de novo the circuit court can take any action the Board of
Adjustment could have taken upon a proper showing by the
aggrieved party.2 8
Unlike section 681, however, in section 163.250, the aggrieved party
had to be the property owner seeking the variance, no matter what the
situation.209 The Lemon Law has no words about an "aggrieved party.i21 In
Mason I, the court implies that the manufacturer is the "aggrieved party. 21 1
Whereas section 163.250 talks about any "aggrieved party" going to the
circuit court, the only aggrieved party under that zoning law is the property
owner, the one seeking a variance. 2 Therefore, that party has the burden of
proving entitlement to a variance. Even if adjoining property owners go to

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.

Id.
See generallyFLA. STAT. § 163.255 (1981); FLA. STAT. § 681.102 (1991).

§ 681.104 (1991).
Mason 1,621 So. 2d at 722.
FLA. STAT. § 163.250 (1981).
FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(12) (1999).
Mason 1,621 So. 2d at 722.
FLA. STAT. § 163.250 (1981).
FLA. STAT.
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court in a de novo proceeding, the property owner still has the burden to
demonstrate the variance entitlement. 2"
The Lemon Law is also silent on any equivalent point. 214 Under the
Mason I reading of Del Marco, anyone requesting a trial de novo becomes
the "aggrieved party" regardless of which party or who is saying the vehicle
was a lemon. 2 1 ' To the contrary, in Del Marco, the property owner always
had to affirmatively prove why the variance should be granted by
demonstrating a hardship.
The underlyin statutory basis for this zoning statute and the Lemon
Law are different.
In Del Marco, the de novo proceeding is not an appeal;
it is one that starts anew as if nothing occurred previously. 218 There the
circuit court sits ab initio like the Board of Adjustment, and must decide
whether the property owner proves that the variance should be granted. 219
Under the Lemon Law, the circuit court has to decide by trial de novo or
otherwise whether the consumer proves a statutory violation. 2W In these
contexts, a trial de novo cannot be anything like an appeal. Thus, on this
point, Mason I's analogy to Del Marco was misapplied and misconstrued.
There was another inconsistency between section 681 and Del Marco's
zoning statute that Mason I failed to grasp. Under the Lemon Law, the trial
court may be faced with having to determine other legal claims between the
parties.Y In section 163.250, the circuit court is sitting as the Board of
Adjustment, doing just what the Board does.2 In the motor vehicle Lemon
Law context, however, a circuit court is deciding, as in Mason, other claims
like Magnuson-Moss, which an arbitration board cannot handle. 2 23 Mason I
only makes it more convoluted procedurally by requiring everyone to have
the burden on their own separate claims, i.e., the manufacturer as aggrieved
by the arbitration finding being the plaintiff, and the consumer as the
proponent of a Magnuson-Moss claim as some alternative plaintiff, coplaintiff
would
have proceed
been more consistent for
Mason 1, or
andcounter-claimant.
practical, to have theIttrial
de novo
with the consumer

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Del Marco, 426 So. 2d at 1032.
FLA. STAT. § 681.1095 (1999).
Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 722.
Del Marco,426 So. 2d at 1032.
See id. at 1029.
Id. at 1032.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 681.1095 (1981).
Id.
§ 163.250.
Id. § 681.1095.
Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 721-22.
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who is able to put into evidence the Arbitration "Decision" as plaintiff on all

claims just like any typical plaintiff at trial.
One might argue a zoning statute cannot be analogized to the Lemon
Law. Yet once that analogy is undertaken it should be correctly compared.
Mason I failed in this task.
That result, therefore, demonstrates the Fifth
District did not thoroughly analyze the case it relied on, and instead may
have forced a result more consistent with a particular social philosophy
rather than a sound judicial construction. That is to say, a consumer friendly
result.
2. Mason Is Inappropriate Reliance on Ad Valorem Tax Statutes
When the other precedent Mason I relied on is scrutinized, an even
more serious misapplication of the law occurs. The other statute referred to
by Mason I is section 194.226 Neither upon facial comparison nor by
analytical construction does section 194 bear any resemblance to the Lemon
Law. Section 194 involves ad valorem taxation and relief from valuations
on property. m It is a complicated statute which has often been amended
over the years. As to what is pertinent on the trial de novo issue, a previous
That Board
version of section 194 created a Board of Tax Adjustment.
was used by Mason I for comparison to a lemon law arbitration panel.2 9
They are, however, entirely different entities. The Board of Tax Adjustment
is comprised of elected public officials who are from the governing body of
the county,2 0 i.e. county commissioners and two members of the school
board. 231 All of these individuals are elected public officials. This Board
has no similarity to members of a lemon law arbitration panel who are
selected by an Assistant Attorney General, who are not publicly elected, and
who have no qualifying substantive prerequisites for appointment. z 2
This Board of Tax Adjustment hears tax complaints. z3 Section
194.032(6)(c) is more precise than the later enacted Lemon Law. Section
194.036(3) specifically provided: "The circuit court proceeding shall be de
225. See id. at 722.
226. Id.

227.

FLA. STAT.

§ 194.011 (1999).

228. 1969 Fla. Laws ch. 69-140; FlA.

STAT.

§ 194.015 (1975). Section 194 was altered

by the legislature in 1997. 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85 (eff. May 23, 1997). See Kent Wetherell,
The New Burdens of Proof in Ad Valorem Tax Valuation Cases, 25 FLA. ST. U. L.REV. 185
(1997).
229. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 722.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See Bath Club, Inc. v. Dade County, 394 So. 2d 110, 113 (Fla. 1981).
FLA. STAT. § 194.015 (1999).
Id. § 681.1095(1).
See Ch. 77-69, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 120, 120 (codified at FlA. STAT. § 194.015).
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novo, and the burden of proof shall be upon the party initiating the
action., 234 This provision expressly sets forth who has the burden-the
initiating party.
Thus, if someone is precipitating the action in circuit
court that party is the plaintiff, and has the burden of proof. The Lemon
Law is significant by the absence of this type of statutory language. Yet, the
Fifth District, in Mason I, read these otherwise absent words into the
statute. 23 6 Did section 194, as relied upon by Mason I, support a conclusion
that section 681.1095(12) of the Lemon Law should be construed this same
way? The answer is "No."
An "appeal" from a tax adjustment board is quite different from a
lemon law arbitration panel. First, the adjustment board is made up of
publicly elected officials who are constitutional officers. 37 These officers
serve terms at the pleasure of the electorate, and presumably answer to the
public. No similarity exists between a lemon law board member who serves
at the pleasure of the AG and who is answerable only to that office. 238 There
are basically no checks or balances, unlike an elected official, on the
arbitrator selected by the AG.
Second, the ad valorem valuation of property and how it's
accomplished is a more complicated and a much different process than the
Lemon Law.239 Special Masters can be appointed by the adjustment board,
and outside experts employed to present testimony on just valuation. 24 0 The
property might be a large, sophisticated commercial complex. Not much
needs to be said on how that differs from Mason, where the consumer's
claim is that the motor vehicle shudders as a result of the transmission. 241
Third, under then section 194.032(6), not everyone "aggrieved" can
have a trial de novo.242 Property appraisers, the taxing authority, cannot
"appeal" from the Adjustment Board's decision, except in certain limited
243
circumstances.
Yet, under
section
681.1095(12),
either a manufacturer
or
24
consumer can "appeal"
with no
restrictions
on the circumstances.

234. FLA. STAT. § 194.036(3) (1999).
235. Id.
236. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 722.
237. Bath Club, Inc., 394 So. 2d at 112. There is, of course, a constitutional basis to the
Board whose members are constitutional officers. Id Lemon law arbitration board members are
not constitutional officers nor are they publicly elected.
238. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095 (1999).
239. See FLA. STAT. § 194.032(1)(a) (1977); FLA. STAT. § 194.035 (1999).
240. Id. § 194.032(9) (1981 & Supp. 1982).
241. Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 688 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
242. § 194.032(6) (1981 & Supp. 1982).
243. Id. § 194.032(6)(a)(13) (1981 & Supp. 1982).
244. Id. § 681.1095(12) (1999).
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Fourth, Mason I views a decision by the Board of Tax Adjustment 245 as
carrying the same validity as a lemon law arbitration "decision." 246 In other
words, even though under section 194 a taxpayer always has the right to a
trial de novo, he or she has the burden to prove the ad valorem valuation was
in error. Even if the Property Appraiser or Tax Assessor appeals, as the
court in Mason I stated, "he [the taxpayer] would have the burden of
persuasion., 247 This is because, a fact not alluded to by Mason I, the board
of adjustment for ad valorem taxation is a public office, with constitutional
officers making the decisions.m As the Supreme Court of Florida has
stated, "[p]ublic officials are presumed to perform their duties in a proper
and lawful manner." 249 That quoted statement is made within the context of
a challenge to a Board of Adjustment's tax decision. A board of adjustment,
with its publicly elected officials, is presumed to be correct. Nowhere in the
Florida Constitution, statutes, regulations, or case law does Mason I indicate
the authority to elevate a lemon law arbitration board to the status of a board
of tax adjustment or property appraisal adjustment board., 0 Such an
elevated political body has not a scintilla of comparison to a lemon law panel
appointed, without restrictions, by the Attorney General.
3. Mason I Misinterpreted Case Law Precedent
The other principal case discussing trial de novo and burden of proof
relied on by Mason I was Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance SocietyY
That case, however, did not support the holding of Mason L252 In fact, when
correctly read, Bystrom totally undermines the rationale that a lemon law
arbitration panel should
be presumed correct with the resultant burden on the
3
"appealing" party.2

Bystrom, for sure, is not an easy case to understand or to read. Simply
put, it involved the assessed value of the Omni International Hotel in Miami
' 25
in 1978.24 The Omni was described as a "multi-purpose megastructure. 5
245. Now known as the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board, under section 194.
246. Mason 1,621 So. 2d at 722.
247. Id.
248. FLA. STAT. § 194.015.
249. Bath Club, Inc. v. Dade County, 394 So. 2d 110, 113 (Fla. 1981) (citing Boardman
v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1975); Hunter v. Carmichael, 133 So. 2d 584 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1961)).
250. See Mason 1,621 So. 2d at 719.
251. 416 So. 2d 1133 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
252. Seeid. at 1133.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1136.
255. Id.
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It was not only the value placed on the Omni that was in dispute, but also
how that value was determined.256 The appellant was the Property
Appraiser, while the taxpayers were the appellees. 25 7 These taxpayers
originally contested the Property Appraiser's initial valuation of the Omni
and went to the PropertV Appraisal Adjustment Board stating that the
valuation was too high.
The Board agreed, to an extent, and partially
reduced the assessment.259 The Property Appraiser filed suit in circuit court
since the statutory criteria allowing it to contest the Board's decision had
been met.260 An answer and counterclaim were then filed by 261
the taxpayers
since they believed the Board's reassessment was still too high.
The first error in Mason I was to cite as controlling authority an issue
from Bystrom that did not carry a majority of Third District judges.262 As to
what party has the burden
of.proof.and. who .is.theplaintiff,
Mason I refers to
..
053
language in Bystrom which is a minority opinion.
Yet, Mason I construes
that portion of Bystrom as if it is the majority view. 264 This mistake by the
Fifth266District26 is brought to light when Robbins 267
v. Summit Apartments,
Ltd. is reviewed; a case not mentioned in Mason L
Bystrom v. Equitable Life is easily misunderstood. In that case
there is a lengthy majority opinion covering a number of legal
issues. However, the portion of the main opinion entitled 'The
Burden of Proof," id. at 1140-43, represents the view of only one
member of the three-member panel. Two judges joined a special
concurrence, ia at 1145-47, which took a different view of the
burden of proof issue. On the question of burden of proof, the
concurring opinion was joined by a majority of the panel and

256. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1137.
257. Id. at 1136.
258. Id. at 1137.
259. Id.

260. Id.
261. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1137.
262. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 722; Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1136.

263. Mason 1,621 So. 2d at 722.
264. Id.

265. Id. (citing Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 416 So. 2d 1133, 1140-43
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)). These pages were from Judge Nesbitt's opinion for the court, but
on the burden of proof issues for which it was cited, this was not the majority opinion.
266. 589 So. 2d 460,461 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
267. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 719.
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therefore represents the decision of the court. The trial court
should have followed the concurring opinion on that issue. 8
This misreading of Bystrom by Mason I is without doubt. A proper
interpretation of Bystrom actually undermines the Mason holding.
According to Mason I, "[t]he third district [in Bystrom] stated that the
board's assessment of the property value in question would be accorded
presumptive validity." 269 This statement was then used to equate a lemon
law arbitration panel decision in favor of the consumer, as in Mason, having
27° The
the same presumption of correctness as that of a public official.
effect is that a manufacturer at a trial de novo has to overcome the
presumptive validity of the Arbitration "Decision," and it does so as the
plaintiff on this issue. That is, the manufacturer has to prove up the
negative; to disprove that the motor vehicle is defective. Under this
rationale, a trial de novo according to Mason I is not what it has always been
commonly understood to be-a fresh start, a new proceeding.
The paradox is that a majority of judges in Bystrom say the exact
opposite from what Mason I attributed to them.2 71 The burden in Bystrom
rests on the party initiating the circuit court action.27 2 But that result was
required by express statutory language, words which were conspicuously left
out of the Lemon Law. 27* As the actual Bystrom majority states, the
presumption of validity is not to be attributed to the Board of Adjustment's
decision, 27 as Mason I interprets, but instead to the Property Appraiser's
275
Judge Pearson's majority opinion in Bystrom states
initial tax assessment.
the following:
Moreover, the presumption in favor of the validity of the property
appraiser's assessment is unaffected by the fact that the burden of
proof in the Circuit Court is upon the party initiating the action and
that an appraiser may, by virtue of a recent change in the law,
initiate the action. To accord presumptive correctness to the Board
of Adjustment valuation would effectively vitiate the presumptive
276
correctness accorded the property appraiser's assessment.

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Robbins, 589 So. 2d at 461.
Mason 1,621 So. 2d at 722.
Id.
Bystrom,416 So. 2d at 1145-47.
Id. at 1140-41.
See FLA. STAT. § 194.032(6)(c) (1981 & Supp. 1982).
Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1147.
Id. at 1143.
Id. at 1146 (Pearson, J., concurring).
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The majority in Bystrom, consisting of two judges in Judge Pearson's
concurring opinion, in fact concluded the exact opposite from what Mason I
accredited to that case. 277 Judge Pearson, for the majority on this burden of
proof analysis, says that the Board is not to have its decision carry any
presumptive validity at the trial de novo.2 78 Only the property appraiser's
initial tax assessment was to have that presumptive correctness. 7 This is
the antithesis to the Mason I rationale which makes no reference or citation
to Judge Pearson's actual majority opinion. 280 Instead, only Judge Nesbitt's
opinion is highlighted, which on the issue cited by Mason I is not a majority
holding.281
To compound this, Mason I then ties its analysis of who has the initial
burden of proof to whichever party challenges the lemon law arbitration
board decision. 282 In Mason, it was the manufacturer. 283 Thus, if the
manufacturer wants a trial de novo after an adverse lemon law arbitration
hearing, since the panel's decision has presumptive correctness, the burden4
of proof will always be on the party attacking or challenging that decision.2
In essence, therefore, this proceeding is not truly de novo. As stated by
Mason I:
The third district reasoned that if it were otherwise, the proceedings
before the board [of tax adjustment, later called property appraisal
adjustment board] would amount to nothing more than a way
station for a disgruntled party en route to circuit court. Therefore,
the party attacking the decision of the value adjustment board

277. Id.
278. Id. Under section 194, the burden varies depending upon whether the Property
Appraiser has followed statutory requirements. If so, the initiating taxpayer has a burden of proof
of "clear and convincing evidence." Otherwise, the burden is by the preponderance of the
evidence. FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1999). The Legislature changed the burdens which were
discussed in Bystrom, and lessened them to favor the taxpayer. Wetherell, supra note 228, at
229.
279. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1147. Property Appraiser is a constitutional officer. FIA.
CONST. art. VIII, § l(d). See District Sch. Bd. v. Askew, 278 So. 2d 272, 276 (Fla. 1973).
280. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 719.
281. Bystrom, 416 So.2d at 1146 n.15. "Judge Pearson's concurring opinion, joined by
Judge Hubbart, is actually the majority opinion with respect to the portion of the decision relating
to the taxpayer's burden of proof in an 'appeal' of the VAB's decision." Wetherell, supra note
228, at 195.
282. Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., 621 So. 2d 719, 722 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
283. Id. at 721.
284. Id.
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would have 5the burden of overcoming of the presumption of
correctness. U

6
This Bystrom reference is from the minority statements by Judge Nesbitt.28
Mason I, of course, said nothing about adopting a minority opinion of a
Third District panel. This erroneous Bystrom analysis by the Fifth District is
the same interpretation argued by the Attorney General in its Mason I
amicus curiae brief.287 It seems, perhaps, the Mason I panel may have
blindly relied on what the Attorney General said without digging any deeper.
The "way station" metaphor in Mason I, attributed to Bystrom, is
likewise used in error. Mason I thought that if the burden is not placed on
the party who challenges the lemon law arbitration decision, the Board
becomes meaningless and in that case manufacturers, by filing in circuit
court, could force the consumer to start all over with the burden to prove his
or her claim. This would seem unfair.
This "way station" analogy is, however, also used by Judge Pearson for
the majority in Bystrom, but to make an entirely different point from the
Mason I interpretations.' 8 While Mason I is concerned about the arbitration
board becoming meaningless,2 9 the Bystrom majority, in contrast, does not
want the Board of Adjustment being used manipulatively by taxpayers to
circumvent the presumptive validity of the Property Appraiser's initial tax
assessment.2 ° Unlike Mason I, the Bystrom majority is not concerned about
the Board of Adjustment becoming meaningless.2 91 The Bystrom majority
says it can become so. 2 The majority of Bystrom judges were not worried
about the Board of Adjustment, but instead about the Property Appraiser's
initial assessment becoming meaningless.2 93 Only the Property Appraiser's
assessment should have a presumption of correctness, not the Board's. The

285. Id. at 722 (quoting Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 416 So. 2d 1133,
1140-43 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1982).
286. Id.
287. See Amicus Brief, at 9-10; Mason 1, 621 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(No. 92-3074).
288. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1142. "Consequently, the identical public policy
considerations exist to accord the Board's reevaluation presumptive validity.... If it were
otherwise, proceedings before the Board would amount to nothing more than a way station for a
disgruntled party en route to circuit court." Id.
289. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 721.
290. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1142.
291. Id.
292. See Robbins v. Summit Apts., Ltd., 589 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App.
1991).
293. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1147.
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Mason I court actually concluded just the opposite with regard to the Lemon
Law of the Bystrom holding.294
When properly read, the Bystrom majority opinion states that, in a de
novo trial context, the Board of Adjustment decision can indeed be
meaningless. 295 "Lastly, because the very nature of the proceeding in the
Circuit Court is de novo, there is no presumption of correctness which
attaches to the valuation made by the Board of Adjustment. 296 Law review
commentators dealing with section 194 have pointed out that Bystrom does
not stand for the proposition that the Adjustment Board's decision is entitled
to any presumptive correctness. 297 Thus, the Board of Adjustment
proceeding can indeed appear as if it had never occurred. Mason I misreads
and misapplies Bystrom as support for the Fifth District's conclusion that
anyone who challenges a lemon law arbitration decision has the initial
burden, ergo, becomes the plaintiff on that issue.
Mason I should have reached a different result, and not held that the
party losing at arbitration has to be the plaintiff in the trial de novo on that
issue. As a correct analysis of Bystrom demonstrates on this point, Mason I
should not have stood for any precedential authority and its rationale behind
the trial de novo issue should have been overruled by the Supreme Court of
298
Florida in Pitsirelos. This is particularly true since Pitsirelos implicitly
agreed with the Bystrom majority when holding that the lemon law
arbitration board decision does not have a presumption of correctness. 2 99
Thus, Pitsirelos should have repudiated Mason I on this de novo issue
instead of adopting it.
The theory upon which a property appraisal for tax purposes operates,
like in Bystrom, is totally different from the Lemon Law statute. Mason I
either did not understand these differences, or chose to ignore them.
According to the Mason I rationale, based on its Bystrom reliance, the
prevailing consumer becomes one in the same as the arbitration panel in the
circuit court suit.30 Bystrom, however, held that even if the taxpayer wins at
the adjustment board level and the Property Appraiser appeals, the
presumption of correctness attaches only to the Appraiser's initial
30 1
assessment, and not with the Board of Adjustment's subsequent decision.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
1993).
301.
1991).

Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 722.
Id.
Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1147.
Wetherell, supra note 228, at 195.
Chrysler Corp. v.Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1998).
Id. at 714.
See Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., 621 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
See Robbins v.Summit Apts., Ltd., 589 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
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Thus, the taxpayer cannot simply rest on the Board's decision. The Property
Appraiser, if it appeals, may have to be a plaintiff because it is the person
who initiates the circuit court action under that particular statutory language,
but its initial tax assessment was still presumptively correct. 302 The assessor
only has to demonstrate following its statutory guidelines in making the
assessment.0 3 The Board3 4 of Adjustment decision simply has neither
importance nor precedence. 0
In its reliance on Mason I, and by not discerning the error in that court's
citations of Bystrom, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Pitsirelos,reached an
unsupportable result. ° 5 As noted, one of the reasons Mason I concludes that
a party challenging the arbitration panel's decision has the burden is because
a lemon law arbitration board is a public body like the Board of Tax
Adjustment in Bystrom.30 6 The arbitration panel's decision, therefore,
carries the presumption of correctness. 307 Thus, the party challenging the
Board's ruling de novo has to be the plaintiff on the Lemon Law issue
because arbitration panels are presumed to be correct. Otherwise, the Lemon
Law arbitration process becomes meaningless. Yet, despite adopting Mason
I's conclusions about trial de novo, Pitsirelos, to the contrary, holds that a
lemon law arbitration panel decision does not carry any presumption of
correctness. 3 08 As a matter of logic, therefore, it should have been
impossible for the Supreme Court of Florida to reach the same conclusion as
Mason I on the trial de novo issue. To have done so can only mean that
Pitsirelosis also wrongly decided.
C.

What a Trialde Novo Should Be

In legal history de novo trials have been seen differently than the
Pitsirelosand Mason I interpretations. Pitsireloscreates an amalgam status
for a trial de novo, existing somewhere between the pure concept and a
3
traditional
49
010 appellate procedure. 09 True, section 681.1095(12) uses the word
appeal.
Pitsirelos,relying on Mason I, seizes upon that terminology to
conclude the legislature intended, although without saying so, that the trial
de novo in circuit court is like an appeal.ml Pitsirelosand Mason I together,
302. See id.
303. Id.

304.
305.
306.
307.

Id.
Pitsirelos,721 So. 2d at 710.
Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 721.
See Robbins, 589 So. 2d at 461.

308. Pitsirelos,721 So. 2d at 714.

309. See id. at 710.
310. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(12) (1999).
311. Pitsirelos,721 So. 2d at 713-14.
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hold that the party asking for the trial proceeding has the burden and
becomes the plaintiff.3 12 Thus, the de novo proceeding is not truly a new

one. Pitsirelosand Mason I places a lemon law trial de novo under section
681 into a twilight zone lying somewhere between the polarity of a
completely new trial proceeding, and an appellate review for adequacy of a
lower tribunal's record. In his partial dissent, Justice Overton would have
found otherwise in Pitsirelos,arguing that a trial de novo is exactly what it
has always been thought to be-a new proceeding as if nothing had taken
place earlier.3 13
From a definitional standpoint, a de novo trial has been viewed in the
pure sense. It is defined as follows, "[a] new trial; or retrial had in which the
whole case is retried as if no trial whatever had been had in the first
instance. 3 14 Read literally this definition itself undermines the rationale
upon which Pitsirelosis decided. A trial de novo proceeding is an entirely
fresh one, without encumbrance of what has already occurred. 315 Of course,
the legislature can alter this traditional application of de novo in its statutory
provisions, as it has done in other instances. For example, section
194.032(6)(c), as now written, qualifies the de novo procedure by stating
that "the burden of proof shall be upon the party initiating the action."
Inherent in this is the existence of an earlier proceeding which carries some
evidentiary weight to the subsequent trial de novo.
Section 681.1095(12) does not have the type of qualifier like section
194.032(6)(c). 317 One must assume this omission from the Lemon Law is
intentional. Since its inception in 1988, this langage in section 681 has
remained unchanged: "shall be by trial de novo."3 r 8 One can argue that the
legislature does not see a lemon law arbitration panel on the same elevated
plane as a public official or public body, such as the constitutionally
312. Id. at 714; Mason L 621 So. 2d at 721-22.
313. Pitsirelos,721 So. 2d at 715.
314. BALLNTNE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1505 (6th ed. 1990); "de novo": "Anew; afresh;
a second time." Id. at 435. Accord, BLACK's LAW DiCTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990). The de
novo concept has its roots deep into common law jurisprudence. The concept of trial de novo
apparently derives from "venire de novo." See Day, Common Law Procedure Acts 290
(1872). The precursor procedure would allow for a second trial on the issue with a new jury,
and is different from a new trial concept. 8 Definitions of Words and Phrases7291 (1905).
There were different situations where the de novo second trial was grantable. See 2 Tidd, The
Practice of the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas 921-22 (1840). It is clear from
this history that this second trial would be as if the first one never occurred. See Sewall v.
Glidden, I Ala. 54, 58 (1840) ("means according to our practice, nothing more, than
submitting the case to another jury for trial.").
315. BALLAiN's LAwDIcTnoNARY 1505 (6th ed. 1990).
316. FL.A. STAT. § 194.036(3) (1999).
317. Id. §§ 681.1095(12), 194.036(3).
318. Id. § 681.1095(12).
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established property appraiser. That official's public duty of setting property
valuations for ad valorem taxation is quite different from determining
whether a transmission rattles or the brakes squeal on a car. Pitsirelos,
inconsistent with its holding on the trial de novo issue, impliedly recognizes
this by concluding that a lemon law arbitration panel's decision does not
carry with it a presumption of correctness. 319 Thus, by definition it has to be
different from a public official or body. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of
Florida should not have interpreted trial de novo to be the same as an appeal.
By doing so Pitsirelosgoes contrary to legislative intent.
The provisions within the Lemon Law address the situation where a
trial de novo request is not undertaken for proper reasons.3 20 This is quite
contrary to the underlying decisional themes in Mason I and Pitsireloswho
thought manufacturers might abuse consumers by always seeking a trial de
novo. To the contrary, section 681 has built-in protections to keep the
consumer from being bludgeoned by the superior economic and litigational
weapons of the manufacturer. 321
There are, quite simply, serious
consequences to a manufacturer for bringing a frivolous de novo
proceeding.
These statutory protections, which are neither analyzed nor
referred to in Pitsirelos or Mason I, support the conclusion that the
legislature has always intended the "trial de novo" to be a new trial, starting
from scratch.
Over the years and in other contexts, the Supreme Court of Florida has
interpreted trial de novo in a different way from it's holding in Pitsirelos.
These historical cases viewed de novo in the pure definitional sense. 3 For
example, in 1909, the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted an old
constitutional provision which said "appeals from justices of the peace
courts in criminal cases may be tried de novo under such regulations as the
legislature may prescribe[.] '324 That case, Nichols v. Bullock,32 5 involved a
situation where the circuit court had allowed new charges and proceedings to
be filed after the appeal from a county court conviction, but not from the
Justice of the Peace ("JP") Court.326 The Bullock court held that the circuit
court's jurisdiction under this provision is truly appellate, and it cannot
conduct a de novo trial proceeding.327 Even though the constitutional
319. Pitsirelos,72l So. 2d at7ll.
320. FLA. STAT. § 681.106 (1999). That statute deals with bad faith claims by a
consumer. Id.
321. See id. § 681.1095(13).
322. Id.
323. See, e.g., Nichols v. Bullock, 50 So. 418 (Fla. 1909).
324. Id at 419 (interpreting FLA. CONST. art. V, § 22).
325. Id. at418.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 419.
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provision there talks in terms of "appeals" from the JP courts, for the trial de
novo in circuit court Bullock is quite clear that this is a totally new
proceeding.
[I]t is provided that appeals from justice of the peace courts in
criminal cases may be tried de novo under such regulations as the
Legislature may prescribe, but this last provision is there expressly
confined to appeals from courts of justices of the peace, and does
not authorize a trial de novo in the circuit court in a criminal case
arising before the county judge and appealed from his court to the
circuit court. [The statute] also expressly confines its provisions
for trials de novo in the circuit courts to appeals in criminal cases
from courts ofjustices of the peace. So far, then, as appeals in civil
or criminal cases are concerned from county judge's courts to the
circuit courts, the jurisdiction of the latter is appellate only, and in
such cases the circuit courts cannot exercise any original
jurisdiction, such as permitting new or amended affidavits or
charges to be there for the first time filed, or by trying the case
anew before the circuit judge or before a jury. 328
Here, the Supreme Court of Florida delineates the contrast between a true
appellate proceeding and a trial de novo which starts "anew," even if the
procedural avenue to circuit court is by way of "appeals. 3 29 This "appeal"
language used is the same language as in section 681. Yet, Pitsirelos and
Mason I interpret "appeal" in a completely different way from Bullock.
In a later case under the same constitutional and statutory provisions,
the Supreme Court of Florida, in Baggs v. Frederick3 describes again what
a trial de novo should be.331 The issue in Baggs involved whether an
accused can have a trial de novo in circuit court after entering a guilty plea
before the Justice of the Peace.332 The Supreme Court of Florida found there
333
could be a trial de novo in circuit court even after a guilty plea below.
There are two clear points from the Baggs decision which demonstrate why
the results reached in Pitsirelosand Mason I are in conflict.
First, Baggs uses the classical definition of trial de novo even in the
context of the "appeal" language. 33
The constitutional and statutory
provisions in Baggs use the trial de novo language within the aegis of an
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Bullock, 50 So. at 419.
i
168 So. 252 (Fla. 1936).
Id. at 252.
Id.
Id. at 252-53.

Id.
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"[a]ppeal from the Justices of the Peace Courts."3 35 The court in Baggs did
not, unlike Pitsirelos,construe the de novo concept any differently because
the proceeding came to the circuit court as an "appeal." 336 To that end,
Baggs contains the following statement: "[Tihat the circuit court 'shall'
proceed to try all criminal cases on appeal from justice of the peace courts de
novo as though the proceedings had been originally begun in the circuit
court." 337 Baggs did not read into the law limitations which do not appear
from its language, such as restrictions on the right to trial de novo. This
rationale 33is8 quite unlike what the same supreme court later did in
Pitsirelos.
Second, Baggs analytically reveals the true nature of a JP court, and
why a trial de novo is so important to proceed later as an original
proceeding. 339 The description of the JP courts from Baggs is not much
different from how a lemon law arbitration board operates in practice:
Justice of the peace courts in Florida are not courts of record. On
the contrary, they proceed with the utmost informality. For the
latter reason, no doubt, the Constitution itself recognizes that
appellate proceedings from such courts are best made to serve the
purpose of justice through, according to the accused, an
unconditional trial de novo in the circuit court, under proper forms
of accusation and before a judge and jury of the highest degree of
capability. 4
In the old days, Justices of the Peace did not have to be attorneys. This
system was abolished by the major Article V revision in 1973. Lemon Law
arbitration panels proceed in similar ways, without rules of evidence or
judicial oversight, informally with a verbal free-for-all akin to "Judge Judy"
or 'The People's Court." This same analysis could have been undertaken
first in Mason I and then later in Pitsirelos. If so, Baggs and Pitsirelos,
decided by the same court, might not have been so divergent in their
rationale.
There are other inconsistencies between Baggs and the Pitsirelos and
Mason I holdings. As noted supra, Mason I, relied on by Pitsirelos,
misreads a minority opinion in Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Society
335. Baggs, 168 So. 2d at 252 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. V, § 22).
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 253. "[We perceive no good reason for reading into the statutory right of
appeal a limitation on its enjoyment not found in its language" Id.
339. Baggs, 168 So. 2d at 253.
340. IH See In re Villeneuve, 709 A.2d 1067, 1070-71 (Vt. 1998) for a good example of
what happens, in reality, at a lemon law arbitration proceeding.
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to be the majority. 34 1 Yet, the majority opinion in Bystrom, not the minority
opinion relied on by Mason I, cited to both Baggs and Nichols. 342 This
citation from Bystrom further supports the argument that the word "appeal"
as used in section 681.1095(12), and contrary to the interpretation in
Pitsirelos/MasonI, is only of procedural and not of substantive importance.
The "appeal" language is just the procedural vehicle to get to circuit court.
Judge Pearson in Bystrom referred to Baggs and Nichols for the following
proposition: "Where a statute vests jurisdiction in the Circuit Court to
conduct a review or hear an appeal de novo, rules of ordinary appellate
proceedings do not apply. 343
Pitsirelosand Mason I interpret trial de novo as a second proceeding,
but it is more like an appeal from a lower tribunal (the lemon law arbitration
panel) so that the earlier proceeding still has effect and the circuit court de
novo action is not truly original. This analysis is contra to Nichols/Baggs,
and the historical view of trial de novo. Neither Baggs nor Bullock are
distinguishable because they are criminal cases. There has never been one
definition for trial de novo in a criminal context and a different one in civil
proceedings. Interestingly, the Attorney General makes this statement in its
public reports on the Lemon Law: Decisions by the state-run board are final
and binding upon the parties, unless within thirty days of receipt, a party
files a petition in the circuit court for a trial de novo. 344 The Attorney
General, for whatever reason, saw fit to omit the "appeal" language. Yet, in
Mason I and Pitsirelosthe AG was arguing that the circuit court proceeding
is like an appeal.
Another case supporting a different trial de novo interpretation from
Pitsirelosis Adams v. Dade County.345 Adams involved a statute whereby
one could appeal to the circuit court when the election supervisor has
stricken an elector's name from the voting rolls.346 On appeal for a de novo
proceeding, the circuit court issued a notice to show cause why the voter's
name "should not be removed from the registration books. 3 47 In rejecting
that procedure as not being a trial de novo, the Third District stated the
following:

341. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1133.
342. Id. at 1147 n.16.
343. Id.
344. See FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(12) (1999).
345. 202 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
346. Id. at 586 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 98.201 (1965)). "Appeal shall be to the circuit
court in and for the county wherein the person was registered.... Trial in the circuit court shall
be de novo and governed by the rules of that court." Id.
347. Adams, 202 So. 2d at 588.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/11

40

Roth: Trial De Novo and Evidentiary Presumptions Under the "Lemon Law":

Roth

1999]

The defect in that procedure which causes us to reject it is that it
places the burden of proof on the electors and requires them to
disprove the supervisor's charges on which he claims their
disqualification. That result should not obtain, because it is the
county or the supervisor of elections who is the complaining party
and who, therefore, should occupy the position of plaintiff or
complainant in the circuit court and have the burden of proof on
the issues to be tried34
Adams is consistent with the correct interpretation of de novo as set
forth in this article. Even though the voter in Adams initially loses and
appeals, he did not have the burden as plaintiff to overcome removal from
the registration list. Fundamentally, the Supervisor of Elections is the
complaining party even if he or she prevails below. This is no different from
a lemon law claim where the consumer, like the Supervisor, is the underlying
complaining party-the one seeking relief under the law.
D. How Section 681 IntendedA TraditionalTrialDe Novo Proceeding
Pitsirelosand its forerunner, Mason I, could have reached results in line
with the historical view of trial de novo and yet remained consistent to the
legislative intent behind section 681. The Lemon Law statute has a number
of provisions which afford adequate protection to a consumer vis-A-vis
greater litigational resources available to a manufacturer. This concern over
the unequal interests between consumer and manufacturer is a major theme
in Mason L Yet, the statutory provisions of section 681 do balance fairness
for the consumer in a trial de novo, even if he or she has already prevailed at
the arbitration level.
First, in the judicial proceedings at circuit court, under section
681.112(1) of the Florida Statutes, attorneys' fees can be awarded. 349 This
is a substantial factor. In Pitsirelos, at the trial level, the consumer was
awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $171,000.35 ° The threat of
attorneys' fees being imposed cannot be lightly taken.
Second, if the manufacturer requests a circuit court action after
arbitration, but for bad motives or intentions, section 681.1095(13) allows
for additional monetary penalties to be imposed.35 1 The statute provides in
part: "If a court determines that the manufacturer acted in bad faith in
348. Id.
349. FLA. STAT. § 681.112(1) (1999).
350. 17 Fla. Jury Rptr. No. 3, at 56-57 (Mar. 1996). See Ford Motor Co. v. Fowler, 705
So. 2d 662,663 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (awarding attorneys' fees against Ford).
351. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095 (13) (1999).
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bringing the appeal or brought the appeal solely for the purpose of
harassment.... the court shall double, and may triple, the amount of the
total award." 352 There is no similar provision applicable to a consumer. This
creates a significant disincentive for a manufacturer to act improperly when
bringing a subsequent judicial action under section 681.1095(13). In Mason,
the consumer had pled "bad faith" in Porsche bringing the "appeal" to the
circuit court, and double and treble damages were sought against the
manufacturer. 353 Although the trial judge had determined Porsche did not
act in bad faith, the potential risk exposure created could have been well into
six figures for an enhanced award.
The punitive imposition on a
manufacturer for bringing an appeal in bad faith and the consequences can
be seen in FordMotor Co. v. Starling.35 5 In that case, the manufacturer was
sanctioned with treble damages on a $59,589 repurchase award. 356 It is
submitted that this type of award can be effective in protecting the consumer
from unwarranted litigation after a successful arbitration proceeding. The
potential for such an award has a chilling effect, with the trial court then able
to protect the consumer to ensure the litigational playing field remains level.
Third, section 681.1095(9) permits the arbitration "decision" to be
admitted into evidence.357 Justice Overton in his separate Pitsirelosopinion
recognizes that this "decision" is a significant piece of evidence for the
consumer. 358 This is so even without any presumptions attaching. The
manufacturer, just as a practical matter, is put to the daunting task of
convincing a judge or jury that all the "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions
of Law" in the "decision" finding the motor vehicle to be a "Lemon" is not
persuasive.
Fourth, the manufacturer is subject to a twenty-five dollar per day
liquidated damages award computed from forty days after the arbitration
decision is received.359 The intent behind section 681.1095(13) is to provide
monetary relief so the consumer can obtain replacement transportation
during the delay on the disposition of the litigational issues. Pitsirelos
upholds this provision against a constitutional challenge, but also finds that
the damages must be proven. 360 In Mason, this potential damages exposure
352. Id.
353. Mason II, 688 So. 2d at 363.
354. Id.
355. 721 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
356. Id. at 335.
357. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(9) (1999).
358. Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1998).
359. § 681.1095(13).
360. Starling, 721 So. 2d at 335. Pitsirelosquashed the District Court of Appeal decision
on the issue of presumption of correctness of an arbitration award. Pirsirelos,721 So. 2d at 710.
It also upheld the $25.00 per day "penalty" as constitutional, if prove to be a loss. Id. A
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totaled nearly $50,000. Again, not an insignificant sum and one which is an
incentive against the manufacturer acting unreasonably in asking for a trial
de novo.
Fifth, section 681.1095(12) seems to impose an affirmative duty on the
appellant to make sure the petition is well founded. 361 The requests for trial
de novo must be in a "written petition" and "state the action requested and
the grounds relied upon for appeal." 362 Mason I finds this provision to be
analogous to filing a notice of appeal, and is contrary to starting a legal
proceeding "anew" or de novo which ignores the benefit of the previous
arbitration hearing. It is just as reasonable, however, that section
681.1095(12) requires the "petition" to appeal as one more guarantee of
protection that litigation abuse, by either side, does not occur. Justice
Overton, again in his minority view in Pitsirelos,believes similarly. 363 The
trial court under the statute essentially screens the "petition" to ensure it is
legally based before letting a "trial de novo" go forward. This provides a
"gatekeeper" role to help prevent litigation abuse.
None of the other statutes analogized in Mason I or Pitsireloshave any
type of protective infrastructure like section 681. These failsafe provisions
distinctively separate the Lemon Law from any other statutory blueprint, and
are essentially directed unilaterally at the manufacturer. Yet, Pitsirelosand
Mason I seem oblivious to these details and differences. With these built-in
disincentives, finding that a trial de novo is a new proceeding altogether does
not contravene the Lemon Law's legislative intent of protecting the
consumer. Even before Pitsirelos and Mason I manufacturers were not
routinely seeking appeals to the circuit court. During 1990 and 1991, a total
of only nine appeals were brought from hundreds of arbitrations. In 1992,
for example, of the total number of cases arbitrated manufacturers
"appealed" only nine percent. 36 By' 1995 only twelve percent of the Board's
decisions were being appealed.
This is hardly an opening of the
floodgates. 66

Washington state statute imposing a $25.00 a day fine, although a little different from Florida's
statute, survived constitutional challenge in Ford Motor Co. v. Barrett,800 P.2d 367 (Wash.
1990). Pitsirelos,721 So. 2d at 710.
361. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(12) (1999).
362. Id. § 681.1095(12).
363. Pitsirelos,721 So. 2d at 715-16.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 713-14. Excessive appeals have not proved to be the case in reality.
Manufacturers, having lost at arbitration, do not routinely file for trial de novo proceedings in
circuit court. According to the most recent annual reports available, in 1995, 12%, or 24 out
of 200 consumer awards were "appealed" by manufacturers. Id. at 713.
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From a realistic, legal, economic, and public relations standpoint, a
manufacturer does not routinely want to go into court after an arbitration
loss. Serious thought and evaluation has to go into any such decision. Even
by the AG's own data, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that
manufacturers arbitrarily or unreasonably force consumers into a post
arbitration judicial proceeding.
IV. THE EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF A LEMON LAW ARBITRATION BOARD
DECISION

It naturally follows from Mason I, where the manufacturer has the
burden to overcome the arbitration award that the issue of what evidentiary
effect to give that "decision" would arise.567 Section 681.1095(9) states that
"[iun any civil action arising under this chapter and relating to a dispute
arbitrated before the board, any decision by the board is admissible in
evidence." 368 In this section of the article, various legal interpretations by
the courts regarding the evidentiary effect to be given to a lemon law
arbitration decision are reviewed and discussed. These analyses have ranged
from a presumptive correctness of validity to be given the "decision" with an
affirmative duty on the challengers to prove why it is invalid, to the Supreme
Court of Florida's Pitsirelosstatement that the "decision" comes in like any
other evidence but with no presumption. 369 Despite this straightforward
approach in Pitsirelos, there needs to be further clarification due to the
logical inconsistency in the Supreme Court of Florida's trial de novo holding
and then its determination that no presumption attaches to an arbitration
result.
The Pitsirelos court seemingly has no idea of what form or manner
these lemon law arbitration "decisions" are to be written and prepared, or
from a practical standpoint the impact such a "decision" has at trial. A
"decision" by the Board contains official "Findings of Fact" and
"Conclusions of Law." The lay people on the arbitration panel do not write
this document-the Assistant Attorney General who acts as counsel to the
Board does. This document, written by the Attorney General, usurps both
the judge and jury function in the circuit court's trial de novo. Obviously,
the court in Pitsirelos did not realize this fact or its true impact at trial.
Justice Overton, whether or not he understood, makes oblique reference
to a
37
favorable "decision" being a strong piece of evidence to present. 0
367. The statute makes these Decisions of the Board admissible in evidence in any civil
action. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(9) (1999).
368. Id. § 681.1095(9) (1999).
369. Pitsirelos,721 So. 2d at 713.
370. Id. at 715-16.
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As a practical matter this "decision" as evidence is indeed significant,
particularly in a jury trial. From a trial lawyer's standpoint these "Findings
of Fact" and "Conclusions of Law" are daunting to overcome after the jury
sees them, usually in a trial board poster size format. Just looking at the
document may be persuasive to the jury-especially with its large print of
"Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions of Law." Moreover, this also may
potentially confuse a jury since the trial judge tells them, through
instructions, that the court decides questions of law and they, the jury, decide
the facts.171 Yet, in the arbitration "decision" both are already recited.
A.

Backgroundof EvidentiaryPresumptions

In order to have any presumption in Florida, the Lemon Law
Arbitration Panel has to be elevated to the status of a public official or body.
Several districts, most notably the Fifth District in Mason II,gave the
arbitration decision a presumption of validity.372 To the extent it is
inconsistent with Pitsirelos,Mason II is overruled by the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision.373 None of these courts, however, truly analyze why this
statutory Board should or should not be elevated to such a lofty plateau.
Although Pitsirelosreaches the correct result in denying a presumption, it
gives little rationale for the decision on the issue.374
The court in Mason II held that the arbitration award was to be given a
presumptive validity of correctness.375 This presumption is like a lower
tribunal decision in "the context of an appeal."
That court stated: "[T]he
'presumption' terminology we utilized in Mason and Sheehan was intended
to refer to the presumption of validity of a lower tribunal's decision in the
context of an appeal."
The trial judge in Mason entered a ruling that the
378
decision was a "bubble-bursting" type.
arbitration
the
for
presumption
Once competent evidence is adduced, however, that presumption vanishes.
That analysis is rejected in Mason II.The appellate court, for support,
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

STANDARDJURYINSTRUCflONS §§ 1.1,2.1 (1998).
Mason I,688 So. 2d at 370.
See Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1998).
Id. at 715.
Mason II,688 So. 2d at 370.
l
Id.
Id A property appraiser's valuation carries a presumption of correctness. Id. It is a

FLA.

"burden" shifting presumption, and not a "bursting bubble." Mason 11,688 So. 2d at 370. Public

policy considerations governed the establishment of that burden shifting. Id. Thus, in a circuit
court action initiated by a taxpayer they have the burden to produce evidence of the "nonexistence of the fact presumed-that is, that the Property Appraiser's assessment is not correct."
Wetherell, supra note 228, at 226.
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looked to its conclusionary language in Sheehan and Mason I that a "trial
court is to grant the Board's decision a presumption of validity." 379 As such,
the Fifth District in Mason II3 80
holds that it is error for the trial court not to do
so in the de novo proceeding.
This Mason-Sheehan presumption of validity means it also affects the
burden of proof.3 81 In a way, this determination is the tail that wags the dog.
Because the arbitration decision carries a presumption which shifts the
burden of proof to the party attacking it, at the de novo trial the party
opposing that decision is the plaintiff. In effect that presumption alters the
nature of the de novo proceeding and makes it something different from
what a trial de novo has traditionally been understood to be. This
evidentiary presumption forces the de novo proceeding to be more like an
appeal. Of course, in all appellate cases as amicus curiae the AG's argument
has been for the highest possible evidentiary presumption for an arbitration
decision.
Although Mason II came after Mason I and Sheehan, its result can be
said to have been driven by the Fifth District's initial view in those earlier
cases, that arbitration boards are analogous to a court, a formalized
arbitration proceeding, or some public body. Thus, the "decision" comes to
the reviewing court de novo with a presumption of correctness. One
problem from Mason II on this issue, and not addressed, is what happens if
the presumption is rebutted? 382 Does the jury or trier of fact merely decide
who wins on a general verdict form, or is there to be a specific verdict
finding that evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption has been
presented? 38 3 No appellate case has ever tried to evaluate the basis of this
rebuttable presumption as it applies to a lemon law arbitration board
decision. That is to say, is it public policy or something else?384 Is the
arbitration board a public or elected official? 385 (The AG's amicus briefs
have argued as such.) Does this concept of the arbitration board being a
lower tribunal mean that the decision is to be considered a "judgment" which
is presumed to be correct?38 6 And, what is the burden of proof necessary to
overcome 38this
presumption, the greater weight or clear and convincing
7
evidence?
379.
380.
381.
382.

Mason II, 688 So. 2d at 369 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Sheehan was a bench trial, and one not by jury.
See Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987).

383. See generally,C. Earhardt,

FLORIDA EVIDENCE

§ 302.2, at 83-84 (1997).

384. IM §304.1 at90.
385. See generally Palm Beach v. State, 342 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1976); Boardman v. Esteva,
323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1975).
386. See Melbourne State Bank v. Wright, 145 So. 598, 601 (Fla. 1932).
387. See Caldwell v. Division of Retirement, 372 So. 2d 438,440 (Fla. 1979).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/11

46

1999]

Roth: Trial De Novo and Evidentiary Presumptions Under the "Lemon Law":
Roth

The legislature could have said that arbitration board decisions under
section 681 are to be given presumptive validity in a subsequent judicial
proceeding. The legislature has done so in other situations.388 Yet, in
section 681 they did not.
The only authority on this point within Mason II is Hollywood Jaycees
v. Department of Revenue. 389 Hollywood Jaycees is a constitutional due
process case where the Department of Revenue ("DOR") reversed a board of
adjustment tax exemption without affording notice or a hearing to the
adversely affected taxpayer.3 9 It is a case decided under section 120 and
has, therefore, no application to section 681 which specifically excludes the
Arbitration Board from the administrative procedures of section 120.391 Of
course, an administrative law proceeding is conducted in accordance with
the rules of evidence. In Lemon Law arbitration, the rules of evidence do
not apply.
B.

The PitsirelosRuling on PresumptionsDid Not Clarify the Issue

In Pitsirelos, the Supreme Court of Florida, as noted, held that there
was no evidentiary presumption of correctness to be given a lemon law
arbitration decision.3 2 Pitsirelos overruled Mason II on that point.393 The
court interpreted section 681 at face value, whose provisions only say that
the "decision" is admissible. 94 To give it 395
some evidentiary presumption
would raise serious constitutional problems.
Despite this correct ruling,
the Pitsireloscourt did not go far enough in its analysis. Also, Pitsirelos
does not grapple with 396
the practical effect such. a decision has when
introduced into evidence.
It is imperative for the Supreme Court of Florida, and other courts, to
recognize the true nature of these arbitration board "decisions." As afi
example, the Mason "decision" is attached as an Appendix to this article.
Perhaps, if judges do understand the true nature of this type of "decision,"
then some evidentiary restriction of its use might occur. Justice Overton, in
his Pitsirelos concurring and dissenting opinion, indicates a better
388. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.46 (1999); Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v.
Bonanno, 568 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990); Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 326 So. 2d 421
(Fla. 1976).
389. 306 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1974).

390. Id. at 109.
391. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(11) (1999) ("exempt from the provisions of [section]120").
392. Pitsirelos,721 So. 2d at 711.
393. L
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. See id.
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understanding of the nature of the document and its impact if introduced into
evidence. 397 What Pitsirelos should have done is to hold that the "Fact" of
the Arbitration Board's decision is admissible, that is to say, the result
only. 398 Such a holding still is consistent with section 681.1095(9). On the
other hand, if the Supreme Court of Florida wants to let the "decision" in its
entirety come into evidence, then it should revisit its foundational decision
that the trial de novo is not an altogether new proceeding but something
closer to an appeal.
Under the analysis of this article, with a trial de novo at circuit court
being truly a new proceeding, the plaintiff/consumer already has a
substantial piece of evidence to support his or her case. The administrative
regulations require that a lot of information be contained in the "decision"
including "findings of fact," "a conclusion with supporting rationale of
whether the standards for refund or replacement have been met," and "a
statement of the remedy," among other things. 399 It is just as usable to a
manufacturer should it win and the consumer requests a judicial proceeding.
At trial this document carries persuasive impact even without any
evidentiary presumption, particularly on a lay jury. It is an affirmative0-iece
of evidence for a consumer to have, as any trial lawyer can clearly see.
This written "decision" comes into evidence almost like an expert's
report, yet no foundation or predicate has to be established. There is hearsay
and double hearsay in the "decision," conclusions of law, and findings of
fact. This all has formidable evidentiary persuasiveness, even in a real trial
de novo. Thus, the arbitration board and its "decision" do not become a
meaningless "way station" on the road to the courthouse, as feared by Mason
1.401

V. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ROLE IN THE LEMON LAW ADMINISTRATION
Neither the legislature nor any court has examined the role played by
the Attorney General in these Lemon Law proceedings. There is a potential
397. Pitsirelos,721 So. 2d at 715.
398. See id.
399. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-32.033(5)(a)-(f), (6) (1993).
400. This procedure might also benefit the Attorney General since, with the presumption,
it may be less likely anyone will want to depose arbitrators which the Attorney General so
vehemently opposes.
401. See Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 416 So. 2d 1133, 1147 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Pearson, J., concurring in part). "[T]he Circuit Court litigation will proceed
as any other original litigation, unaffected by the results of the administrative resolution. In our
view, the Legislature, by providing that the Circuit Court proceeding be de novo, intended it to be
no other way." Id.
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conflict of interest which is being ignored by the AG. This can be readily
seen when the Lemon Law role of the AG is examined.
The true administrative power behind the Lemon Law program is the
AG's Office. 40 The regulations controlling how the arbitration process
works are formulated by the AG.4 °3 An entire division and staff within the
Attorney General's Office has been created to regulate and administer the
Lemon Law. 4°4 Although the Division of Consumer Services is also
involved in the program, its role is limited and inconsequential when
compared to that of the AG.
The AG's role here creates a potential conflict of interest which in turn
taints the objectivity of the arbitration process, or at a minimum creates an
appearance of impropriety. This is because the AG's Office wears different
hats in its roles as Lemon Law administrator and counselor. As noted, the
AG's Office promulgates the regulations which control the process. On a
practical basis, it answers questions from consumers. Its consumer manuals
provide, in essence, legal advice to those wanting to utilize the Lemon
Law.40- The AG also selects the arbitrators and qualifies those who sit on
the panels.406 Moreover, the AG serves as legal counsel to the arbitration
board.4w According to the sworn testimony of the arbitrators in Mason
depositions, their "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusion of Law" to support the
408
"decision" were drafted/written by the staff counsel from the AG's Office.
The Mason Arbitrators did not see the final written "decision" after it was
402. See RtA. STAT. § 681.109 (1999); RtA. ADMI. CODE §§ 2-30.001(1), 2-32.002(1),
(2) (1993). The Executive Director of the Lemon Law Arbitration Program is a member of the
Attorney General's Office. "The Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board is administered
by the Office of the Attorney General." Butterworth, Consumer Guide to the FloridaLemon Law
5 (1997) (emphasis added). The Division of Consumer Services of the Department of
Agriculture and Consumer Services also has a role, more limited than the AG, under Section 681.

See id § 681.102(7). The Division becomes more involved with administration aspects of a
consumer filing a request for arbitration. Their role is, however, limited. Idt § 681.109(2)-(6).
The Division is also involved in certifying manufacturer's informal dispute settlement programs.
Idt § 681.108.
403. FLA. STAT. § 681.118 (1991).
404. Id. The Lemon Law Arbitration Program is substantial within the Attorney
General's Office. For 1997-98, the total operating budget is $1,675,851. Ofc. of Attorney
General Budget, provided by facsimile on 3/17/98 at 11:00 AM. Salaries and benefits were
budgeted at $1,086,058. In 1995-1996, salaries and benefits were $890,331. Id
405. See FLA. STAT. § 681.103(3) (1999); Butterworth, supra note 21 (discussing the
contents of the Lemon Law rights booklet provided to consumers).
406. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(1) (1999).
407. Id.
408. Deposition of William H. Willis, Nov. 14, 1994, Case No. CI 94-1691, at 36, Trial
Transcript, Feb. 7, 1995, Vol. VII, at 671-72,75,87.
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drafted by the AG, which was based on the AG's staff attorneys' notes taken
during the proceedings. 409
The AG has a vested interest in the Lemon Law operation. The AG

certainly obtains political benefits from a program that helps consumers, and
this should not be minimized. For example, elaborate compilations of
statistical data are prepared by the AG to publicize the effectiveness of the
program.
In addition, press releases are issued to trumpet Lemon Law
achievements, thanks to the Attorney General. 41 The Lemon Law provides
a political vehicle which allows the AG to champion, rightly or wrongly, a
philosophical position of consumerism. In a rhetorical sense, what politician
is going to stand up and say that consumers in the electorate are getting too
much? Certainly not a popularly elected AG. In its political and
administrative roles, the AG wields essentially unrestricted power, unless the
judiciary becomes involved. Accordingly, the AG's Office may not be
totally without bias in its Lemon Law involvement.

409. Trial Transcript, Feb. 7, 1995, Vol. VII, 672, L. 3-6.
410. See generally, Robert Butterworth, New Motor Vehicle Make, Model and
ManufacturerStudy 1992-1994; Robert Butterworth, THE CAPrroL ANNUAL REPORT, 1992.
411. Here is a sampling of some News Release(s) from the Office of the Attorney
General:
November 25, 1996 - "Florida's Lemon Law Arbitration Program has crossed
the $100 million mark in refunds and replacements for consumers whose new
motor vehicles were chronically defective, Attorney General Bob Butterworth
and Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services Commissioner Bob
Crawford announced today. * * * 'To provide this amount of consumer relief
in fewer than eight years of operation is remarkable,' Butterworth said. 'It
shows that Florida's Lemon Law program is probably the most effective in
the nation."'
Florida Lemon Law Program Reaches $100 Million Milestone, NEws RELEASE (Fla. Atty.
Gen.), Nov. 1996.
February 19, 1996 - "Walter Dartland has returned to the attorney general's
office to oversee the agency's Lemon Law Arbitration Program and develop
consumer protection strategies for Attorney General Bob Butterworth."
Walter Dartland Returns to Attorney General's Office, NEws RELEASE (Fla. Atty. Gen.), Feb.
1996.
August 15, 1997 - "Attorney General Bob Butterworth has announced that his
office's Internet home page now contains a list of vehicles bought back by
manufacturers in connection with Florida's Lemon Law since 1989. 'Using
that list, a shopper can determine whether the vehicle they are interested in
buying was repurchased in Florida by a manufacturer because of complaints
of chronic problems,' Butterworth said."
Consumers Can Check Out "Lemons" on the Web, NEWS RELEASE (Fla. Atty. Gen.), Aug.
1997.
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Thus,"the administrative and legal roles of the AG's Office should be
recognized for what they really are. The Lemon Law is big political
business.412 The AG's Office, for all practical purposes, acts as Ombudsman
counsel for the consumer. For example, on every known reported appellate
opinion discussed in this article, the AG's Office has argued as amicus
curiae for a strong consumer position. 413 It did so again before the Supreme
Court of Florida in Pitsirelos.414 When the briefs of the AG are read, one
has no doubt that they are committed, single-mindedly, to expanding the
program and consumer rights and to protecting their political fiefdom, and
power base.4 15 There is nothing wrong with this. One should not be,
however, naive about it or turn away from this political reality.
As the Mason litigation demonstrates, the AG is an aggressive
416
watchdog in protecting the legal and statutory turf it has created for itself.

As with any governmental power, the potential for creeping abuse and
expansion is endemic. Mason is the first case where arbitrators were
actually deposed. 17 The AG's Office vigorously fought to prevent these
depositions,
entering appearances in the Mason case on several different
4 8

occasions.

1

The absence of something less than an objective interest can be clearly
seen in Mason II, where the AG once again appeared as amicus for the
412. The Attorney General's record during an election revealed that work done for
consumers in the Lemon Law area obviously proved valuable.
413. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1998); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Singh, 664 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); General Motors Corp. v. Neu, 617
So. 2d 406 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Sheehan v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 635 So. 2d 1067
(Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1994).
414. Pitsirelos,721 So. 2d at710.
415. See Amicus Brief for the Attorney General of the State of Florida; Mason v.
Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 621 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
416. Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 688 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App.
1997); Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 621 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). In
Mason, the Attorney General was involved both at the trial level and the appellate level, and even
after the second appeal. Additionally, the Lemon Law Arbitration Program had a staff budget of
$1,675,851 in 1997-1998. Between July, 1996 and June, 1997, the Department of Revenue
collected $1,877,997 for fees on the $2 per vehicle charge required by section 681.117 of the
FloridaStatutes. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 719; Mason II, 688 So. 2d at 361.
417. Mason 1f, 688 So. 2d at 370.
418. The manufacturer subpoenaed for deposition the three arbitrators from the Mason
panel. The AG filed a motion to quash and for protective order. The trial judge, on October 14,
1994, denied that motion in part and granted a protective order in part. The trial court also denied
the AG's motion to quash trial subpoenas. The three arbitrators testified in the first Mason trial.
In Mason 1H,the AG was an amicus again. Mason 11, 688 So. 2d at 364. The Fifth District
expanded the scope of the discovery. Id. The arbitrators testified also in the second trial. Id. at
366.
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consumer. 419 In that appeal, while on the one hand arguing for a hig
threshold rebuttable evidentiary presumption for an arbitration decision,
the AG on the other hand also argued to preclude any depositions or trial
testimony from arbitrators. 421 This latter position would have prevented a
manufacturer, or even a consumer, from developing evidence to overcome
the strong resumption of correctness the AG Office wanted for arbitration
decisions.
The Attorney General in Mason II, after arguing that a
manufacturer should not be able to depose an arbitrator or subpoena one for
trial in order to overcome a presumption of correctness of the "decision," 423
attempted to elevate the Board to the status of a constitutional public official.
Their Brief stated:
[T]he New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board was established by the
Legislature within the Department of Legal Affairs and consists of
members appointed by the Attorney General, a officer.... The
Arbitration Board acts collectively in the capacity of a public
official and the party424aggrieved by its decision may seek trial de
novo in circuit court.
Their argument is that the Board's "decision" should have a presumptive
validity which shifts the burden of proof to the challenging party, but that
party should not then be able to develop testimony to rebut the "decision"
426 or
to undermine it.425 The AG clearly wants to have its cake and eat it too.
Even after Mason II, when the Fifth District had ruled that arbitrators
could testify and be deposed, the AG again entered an appearance in the trial
court with new motions for protective orders, arguing that their handpicked
419. See Mason II, 688 So. 2d at 363.
420. Initial Brief ofAmicus Curiae,at 17-21, Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 689
So. 2d 349 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).

421. Id.
422. Let there be no mistake, the AG's Office views these arbitrators as quasi-judicial,

deserving the same protection from discovery as a judge. See Motion to Quash and for Protective
Order, Case No. CI 94-1691, § 4, at 2-4 (Sept. 23, 1994).
423. Initial Brief ofAmicus Curiae, at 12-17, Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am.,Inc., 689
So. 2d 349 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
424. Id. at 18-19.

425. Id.
426. This is an example as to why the AG's Office may not fairly and impartially handle
its role, and that either its involvement should be recognized for what it is or a different procedure
established. There is, it is submitted, an appearance of impropriety with the way it is involved
and the power the Attorney General wields in this area. Cf., Migliore v. City of Lauderhill, 415
So. 2d 62, 64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing that a police department complaint

review board, composed exclusively of law enforcement personnel, "gives the impression of
impropriety" when asked to determine the rights of the public "and one of its own.").
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459

arbitrators were exempt from testimony. 427 This evidence had been sought in
Mason, for litigation strategy purposes even if the arbitrators remembered
nothing, in an attempt to diminish the putative importance of the arbitration
"decision." To win the Mason case at trial, that "decision" had to be
undermined since the Fifth District had given it presumptive validity.
Regardless of the case, jurors should have the opportunity to see and hear
these arbitrators before deciding whether to defer their own judgment to that
of the arbitration "decision." This is particularly necessary if the written
"decision" document comes into evidence. This "decision," like any piece
of evidence, should be subject to cross-examination and to challenge.
The administrative procedures promulgated by the AG establish a
quasi-judicial function for these arbitration boards which creates a
separation of powers issue.428 For example, the Attorney General's public
429
position in court has been that these board members are "public officers."
That is because these arbitrators are appointed by the AG, who is a public
official and a constitutional officer.430 Thus, the AG regulates the system,
provides legal advice to one of the parties as well as to arbitrators
themselves, and then actually writes the "decision" for the board. These are
just too many hats for the AG to wear. The supreme court, in Pitsirelos,did
not really have this type of evidence presented to it in deciding that case, so
that separation of powers was not violated. 431
As discovered in Mason, arbitrators are not required to be lawyers, or
members of professional arbitration organizations like AAA.4 32 Many are
retired and participate either for the money or as part of community service,
or both. All of that is fine. But it does not make them public officials or
427. See Arbitrators Motion for Protective Order, Case No. CI 94-1691, § 3 (Oct. 14,

1997). This motion attacked the trial subpoena for the three arbitrators on the retrial. It was
argued the arbitrators, even after Mason II, "be protected from testifying at all in the second trial
of this case, as any testimony they may have would be irrelevant to the issue on appeal and at
best, such testimony would be merely cumulative of the Board's written decision, which is
admissible in evidence." id.
428. See Robert C. Downie, Quasi-JudicialProceedingsand ConstitutionalRight: What
is Happeningto Separationof Powers?, 71 FLA. BJ. 44, 46 & nn. 26-29 (1997). The Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Pitsirelosrejected that challenge. Pitsirelos,689 So. 2d at 1134.
429. Mason 1I Brief, at 19 n.5.
430. Id.at 18-19.
431. Pitsirelos,689 So. 2d at 1134.
432. Section 681.1095(3) of the Florida Statutes only requires arbitrators to "be
trained in the application of this chapter...." FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(3) (1999). However,
"at least one member of each board must be a person with expertise in motor vehicle
mechanics." Id. No member may be employed by an automobile manufacturer or dealer "or
be a staff member, a decisionmaker, or a consultant for a procedure." Id. A "procedure"
means "an informal dispute-settlement procedure established by a manufacturer to mediate
and arbitrate motor vehicle warranty disputes." Id. § 681.102(17).
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constitutional officers, or elevate them to a higher level. They do not seem
to fit anywhere within the Article II, section 5 definition
434 of the Florida
Constitution, 433 or as defined by other statutory provisions.
The AG's public reliance on section 112 of the Florida Statutes in its
briefs to create a legal status for these board members is misplaced. Section
112.061(2)(c) defines a public officer as follows:
An individual who in the performance of his or her official duties is
vested by law with sovereign powers of government and who is
either elected by the people, or commissioned by the Governor and
has a jurisdiction extending throughout the state, or any person
lawfully serving instead of either of the foregoing two classes of
individuals as initial designee or successor. 435
Lemon Law arbitrators are not employees or public employees
._.
,,436 since they are
not fulfilling a "regular or full-time authorized position.
Despite this
argument, surely it would be the AG's position that these "officers" or quasijudicial officials are not subject to the financial disclosure provisions of
section 112.3145 .
The issue arises, therefore, about whether it matters that the AG's
Office has a purported conflict of interest due to its various roles within the
Lemon Law process. It is somewhat analogous to Migliore v. City of
Lauderhill,43 where the court saw a potential conflict of interest, although in
a different context, but arguably not unlike the role the AG plays in the
Lemon Law.439 Migliore points out the following:
Further, the fact that the board is required to be composed of law
enforcement personnel belies the kind of impartiality and lack of
bias that are ordinarily requisites of a panel established to
determine substantive rights between the body politic (standing in
433. See Talbot D'Alemberte, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTrUTION - A REFERENCE GUIDE,
37-38 (1991).
434. FLA. STAT. § 163.340(20) (1999). "'Public officer' means any officer who is in
charge of any department or branch of the government of the county or municipality relating to
health, fire, building regulations, or other activities concerning dwellings in the county or
municipality." Id. §§ 843.0855(1)(c), 219.01(1).
435. Id. § 112.061(2)(c) (1999).
436. Id. § 112.061(2)(d).
437. Section 112.3145 of the Florida Statutes requires specified state employees and
state officers to file a "statement of financial interests" with the Secretary of State every year,
detailing enumerated items of income. Id. § 112.3145.
438. 415 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
439. Id. at 64.
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the shoes of the taxpayer) and one of its own whose right to
continue to represent and therefor to financially benefit from that
body politic has been challenged. We do not mean to suggest that
a complaint review board so constituted would necessarily act in a
biased manner; only that it gives the impression of impropriety,
440
which the legislature would obviously have avoided at all costs.

This quotation highlights a fundamental flaw in the Lemon Law. It now
functions with the pervasive involvement of the AG's Office. This factor
should not be overlooked when determining whether or not to overhaul the
statute.
VI. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS AND ACTIONS
Probably on different levels of interest, none of the competing and
contesting parties in the Lemon Law debate are happy with its present status.
For example, things have not gone far enough for the consumer or the
Attorney General. For the manufacturer, the Lemon Law has become a
business sensitive process, particularly in a marketing era when "customer
satisfaction" totally fuels the quest for selling the product.
To be sure, however, whether it is the courts or the legislature someone
needs to examine closely the role the AG's Office plays in the Lemon Law.
At present, it basically roams the Lemon Law plains unrestricted and
unfettered. The public positions taken by them are legally insupportable.
The AG's amicus curiae arguments illustrate a lack of objectiveness, while
demonstrating a constant interest in protecting it's statutory kingdom.41
One thematic basis of this article has been that the courts should not
step into this political fracas, which so clearly highlights the contentious
arguments over divergent Lemon Law positions.
Whether a judge
philosophically believes any of this is good or bad legislation, or despite his
or her own personal experiences with buying a motor vehicle-and everyone
has had them--none of this should be a factor. But, of course, no one in the
real world believes this is very likely.
Nevertheless, any structural modifications to section 681 should be
accomplished through the legislative process. That branch of government
can best examine the experiential data, what the courts have done, political
factors, and the empirical evidence to decide what changes, if any, to make.
For example, one law student commentator, in light of appellate court

440. Id
441. See Anilcus Brief for the Attorney General of the State of Florida, Mason v.
Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 620 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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decisions, proposes 442
to have the legislature eliminate the trial de novo
provision altogether.
The judiciary should not attempt to play a superlegislative role here. Its
participation should be more in line with the "nature of the judicial process,"
and not taking sides on what is in essence a political issue. A judicial role
can be best undertaken by a more historically accurate approach to the legal
analysis when deciding a dispute under this law. For example, the Supreme
Court of Florida, in Pitsirelos,tries to take the approach of Solomon.43 It
adopts the AG's strongly consumeristic position-that the manufacturer who
lost at arbitration is the plaintiff and a trial de novo does not retain its
traditional meaning with the consumer starting over.444 Then, it rejects the
AG's consumerism position that the "decision" of the Board must have a
rebuttable evidentiary presumption. 445 In doing so, the Supreme Court of
Florida only creates more inconsistency between legislative intent, strict
judicial construction, and the "real" world within which Lemon Law lawyers
have to operate.
Listed below are several action plans that are options for these different
branches of government to consider.
A.

Legislative

To properly balance the competing social and economic interests
existing between consumers and manufacturers, the legislature is more
ideally suited to take up this task. Through the legislature, the debate and
decision-making can, for political considerations, better dictate the future of
the Lemon Law. The AG can weigh in on the political side, as he has done
in the past, to argue a particular position. After all, the Attorney General is a
political post, not an ostensibly neutral or unbiased position, nor should it be.
Into this political recipe, motor vehicle dealers, distributors, manufacturers,
and trade associations can bring whatever influence their positions can bear
to the process. It is better to allow these competing interests, all vested, to
battle there between AG/consumer and manufacturer rather than in a judicial
forum where the fundamental analysis should be different from what is
utilized in the political arena.
First, the legislature should decide what is the proper role for the AG's
Office. It is now hard to see an unbiased interest in the AG as the law
presently exists and operates. The appearance of impropriety overwhelms
the AG's involvement since it is charged with selecting the arbitrators,
442.
443.
444.
445.

Daiker, supranote 21, at 270.
See Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1998).
See id. at 713.
See id. at 714.
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giving advice to consumers, running the program, providing legal counsel to
the panels, writing the "decisions," making legal interpretations for the
board, while at the same time performing the executive branch role of
enforcing the law against the manufacturers. This juggles too many different
responsibilities.
One solution is to codify for the Attorney General what it already does
anyway, which is to act as ombudsmen counsel for the consumer and create,
in turn, a different arbitration process like some other states have done using
professional arbitrators. Hearings can still be held geographically and
proceed expeditiously. The integrity of the process, however, might be less
suspect. Manufacturers are now routinely appearing with counsel at
arbitration proceedings because they are so important and the adverse
consequences too great. Let the AG's staff participate for the consumer
since it is their position to interpret section 681 to benefit the consumer, as a
matter of public policy. It is most essential to elevate the skill and
professional level of the arbitration process.
Several years ago, a proposal was circulated to have the arbitration
hearings handled as an administrative law procedure under the auspices of
the Office of Administrative Law Judges ("AUl"). Although this would
formalize the procedure, it would also serve to more clearly reflect the
realities of the Lemon Law process. If an ALU is involved the evidentiary
integrity of the proceedings is maintained. Thus, if the burden of going
forward remains on the party appealing to the circuit court, then the
underlying process should have more guarantees of trustworthiness to create
more reliable results. Also, the AG's Office can act as legal counsel to the
consumer and be officially designated as such, which it is anyway at least de
facto under the present system.
Finally, increased program costs can be handled by user fees. Already
two dollars per motor vehicle is charged to fund the program. 446 Under
section 681.117(1) these fees ."shall be transferred monthly to the
Department of Legal Affairs for deposit into the Motor Vehicle Warran
Trust Fund." 447 This fee is collected when each "new" vehicle is sold.
Needless to say, quite a few new motor vehicle registrations occur in Florida
each year, and this will only continue to increase.
This or a slightly higher
446.

FLA. STAT.

§ 681.117(1) (1999).

447. Id.
448. Id.
449. According to Department of Revenue figures, the remittance fees collected for the $2
per vehicle charge from July, 1996 through June, 1996 was $1,877,977. (Data from D.O.R.
Research and Analysis Div., 3/23/98). There are certainly an ample number of new vehicle
registrations in Florida from which fees can be generated. The R.L. Polk Company's National
Vehicle Population Profile, as of July 1, 1996, indicates for the 1996 model year that 834,669
domestic cars, import cars, and light trucks were registered in Florida.
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fee could generate ample funds to support any basic structural changes to
section 681.
Second, if fundamental legislative changes are not implemented then
ambiguities in the present law should be addressed. If the legislature intends
that trial de novo be just that, then the law should be clarified. The "appeal"
language can be eliminated, and a clearer statement made as to what a trial
de novo is. Still, the "decision" can come into evidence for whichever party
benefits, just like any other evidentiary matter, but without foundational
hurdles having first to be satisfied. If the legislature intends the "appealing"
party to have the initial burden and the proceeding in circuit court be like an
appeal, as Pitsirelos and Mason I have held, then it can be specifically
stated.450 The legislature has done this with other statutes, such as section
194.451 Additionally, if the "initiating" party is not to carry a burden, then
the statute can also be amended to state that. Finally, the issue of whether
the "Decision of the Board" is to have an evidentiary presumption should be
addressed. The legislature can specify whether it should or should not, and
if so what type of presumption. For example, section 681.1095(9) might be
rewritten to say only that the fact or result of the arbitration decision can be
admitted into evidence, but not the physical "decision" document itself.
These are basic language changes that can be effectuated easily, and would
clear up much legal uncertainty.
B.

Judicial

The cases of Mason I and Pitsireloswere wrongly decided on what is a
trial de novo under section 681.1095(12). Regardless what the legislature
does, or fails to do, these Lemon Law issues will not go away. Thus, here
are several suggestions for attorneys and judges to consider and analyze.
First, the Supreme Court of Florida, if the opportunity comes again,
should follow more closely the analysis set forth in this article. It should
revisit its erroneous trial de novo ruling in Pitsirelos. As argued herein, a
different result than the one reached from Mason I and Pitsirelos would still
be consistent with the existing legislative intent behind section 681.
Second, constitutional challenges to the statute must be well founded.
Any broad-based constitutional attack on section 681, or its individual
provisions, will likely fail. Certainly, at the trial courts and the appellate
districts. The Supreme Court of Florida's response to the constitutional
challenge in Pitsirelos, signals where that presently constituted court wants
450. See Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 722; Pitsirelos,721 So. 2d at 713.
451. See FLA. STAT. § 194.036(3) (1999). 'The circuit court proceeding shall be de
novo, and the burden of proof shall be upon the party initiating the action." Id. §
194.034(6)(c).
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the districts to go. Courts from other jurisdictions have also rejected broadbased constitutional challenges to Lemon Laws. a 52 If a constitutional attack
is mounted it should be directed, under the present procedures, at how the
law operates and its effect on a case specific basis. The court in Pitsirelos
left this door open. The law may be facially constitutional, but as applied it
may be another matter. To make a constitutional argument effective, the
challenging party must develop record support for the applicational
unfairness and deficiencies in the law. This should include empirical data,
experiential support, and attacks on the arbitration process, its selection,
implementation, and source. Simply, a "Brandeis Brief' approach is
required. Discovery directed to the AG's Office would be a necessity,
although quite naturally the substantial resources of that office would object.
A court hearing such a constitutional challenge must be able to see and
understand how this arbitration system works. Videotaping hearings,
retaining university professors to study the fairness of the lemon law
arbitration process to provide expert testimony, and deposing arbitrators all
would be necessary tools to mount such a valid constitutional challenge. In
short, this would be a substantial and costly effort for both sides, which
might be better compromised in a political and not a judicial venue.
Third, if the courts are going to let the entire written "decision" with
"Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions of Law" come into evidence, then the
proceeding in circuit court should truly be de novo. The consumer can
present evidence of the arbitration award, and that may be all that is needed.
The initial burden of going forward with proof, however, should still rest
with the party claiming the motor vehicle to be a "Lemon." From a practical
standpoint, particularly in a jury trial, having the evidence of the arbitration
award of "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions of Law" will obviously be
Subliminally, in and of itself this may carry the day.
powerful.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court of Florida can later read the statute to
require only the fact or result of the arbitration "decision" be put into
evidence, and not the physical document itself.
Fourth, the Supreme Court of Florida should prepare a new standard
Jury Instruction relating to the legal effect of a board's "decision." This will
help clear up confusion on the jury's part if the full document comes into
evidence. It will also ensure that too much influence is not placed on it at
trial.
Fifth, the courts should not perform a legislative role in interpreting
section 681 to effect a particular philosophical or social result. In light of
the way the Lemon Law is set up and the AG's involvement, a strict judicial
interpretation of the statute should be followed. Ample protections are built
452. See, e.g., Lyeth v. Chrysler Corp., 929 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1991); Chrysler Corp. v.
Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985).
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in the statutory scheme to prevent unfairness to the consumer.4 53 The
judiciary should not help rewrite the statute.
Finally, it might be argued that the latest Fifth District case of Ford
Motor Co. v. Starling454 highlights the problem of literally applying the trial
de novo analysis set forth in this article.455 Starling, in fact, does just the
opposite. What Ford did was to stipulate away its right to argue that the
coach builder had created the problem.456 It is a stipulation and Ford should
have been bound by it whether this circuit court action was a true de novo
proceeding or not. That simply was not an issue on the lemon law claim.
Certainly Ford could have requested the trial court for leave to bring in
Coachmen, the coach builder, on that issue. The trial judge could entertain
that, if good cause existed, in a trial de novo or not. The opinion in Starling
is silent about the record before the arbitration panel. 457 That is, whether the
manufacturer's written responses, its written declaration of a final repair
attempt, or anything in the repair records indicate if Ford had even looked at
the "puck" issue before going to circuit court. On the record presented, this
seems to be simply a case where the manufacturer stipulated away one of its
defenses. 458 Trying to argue it thereafter was one of the reasons for the trial
court's finding of bad faith in bringing the circuit court action.45 9
If anything, Starling demonstrates the effective reins put on a
manufacturer if it brings a subsequent legal action in bad faith. The
consumer is afforded the same level of protection under the pure trial de
novo theory.
The manufacturer in Starling simply did not overcome
evidence presented of a nonconformity, and in its effort to do so tried to use
a defense that had been stipulated away. 461 And for that conduct the
manufacturer paid an enhanced price, plus attorneys' fees-which was not
highlighted in Starling. The legislative intent of section 681, to protect the
consumer, is satisfied in Starling not because the de novo was in the nature
of an "appeal," but due to the manufacturer bringing an action to circuit
court it should not have. This will be a deterrent next time. Starling'sresult
should not have been different had the trial been truly de novo.

453. See FLA. STAT. § 681.
454. 721 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
455. Id. at 335.

456. Id. at 336.
457. See id.
458. See id.
459. Starling, 721 So. 2d at 340.
460. Id.
461. Id
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VII. CONCLUSION

This article has been intended to provide an analysis of why it is
necessary to change the lemon laws from their present existence to a more
evolved and comprehensive law. The business of the Lemon Law is only
going to grow in the future. Its economic consequences will continue to be
profound to all interested parties. As the law presently exists, both from a
statutory and judicial standpoint, it is flawed.
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